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Abstract 
Making three distinct contributions to the literature on international reserves for small 
open economies (SOEs), this thesis is composed of three main chapters. Chapters 1 
and 2 contribute to the underlying theory of optimal international reserves, extending 
the Jeanne and Rancière (2011) endowment SOE model to a production economy, 
each using one of the most common technology specifications in Neoclassical growth 
theory. Chapter 3, then, examines empirically key aspects of reserve holdings as 
observed in a dataset of high and low middle income emerging market economies 
(EMEs) used in the calibration of the preceding theoretical chapters. 
Chapter 1 explores the effects of investment and production on optimal 
reserves in SOE EMEs and derives an optimal reserves-to-output formula in the case 
where capital is the sole factor of production as in the AK model of endogenous 
growth. We refer to this version as the one-factor production SOE AK model, or 
simply the AK model (of endogenous growth). This version implies increasing returns 
to scale (IRS) and is justified on the grounds of the ability of the AK model to 
generate endogenously, via the influence of policy – such as subsidies or taxes on 
investment – on capital accummulation, sustained long-run growth observed in the 
data. We find that the endogenous growth AK model with IRS implies a negative 
relationship between the optimal reserve-to-output ratio and capital-augmenting (in 
fact, here sole-factor) technological progress. Depending on the calibration of the 
productivity parameter, the model quantifies the optimal ratio of reserves to output at 
1.74% for SOEs. 
Chapter 2 introduces labour, making the production function more general. 
More precisely, we switch to a conventional labour-augmenting Cobb-Douglas (CD) 
production function, which embodies alternative assumptions of constant returns to 
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scale (CRS) overall – but with diminishing returns to scale (DRS) for each of the two 
factors, capital and labour – and convergence to a balanced growth path (BGP) in the 
long run. In turn, this version is justified on the grounds of being consistent with a 
long-run BGP in Neoclassical models of exogenous growth and with sustained per 
capita income growth in these models. The second chapter thus focuses on the effects 
of labour-augmenting productivity on the optimal reserves-to-output ratio in a 
production SOE. Moreover, the alternative modelling of the production function, IRS 
AK versus CRS CD, and the type of growth, endogenous versus exogenous, allows us 
to compare the analytical results in chapter 1 (AK model) with those in chapter 2 (the 
CD model). Similarly to the endogenous growth AK model, we find that in the 
exogenous growth CD model along the BGP labour-augmenting technological 
progress decreases the optimal reserves-to-output ratio. Depending on the calibration 
of the labour-augmenting productivity parameter, the CRS CD model quantifies the 
optimal ratio of reserves to output at 5.5% in the richer two-factor production SOE 
model. This roughly three times higher ratio of optimal reserve holdings to output 
arises from the difference in the specification of technology in the production 
functions. This ratio is still quite lower than the corresponding one derived in the 
endowment SOE model of Jeanne and Rancière (2011), 9.1%. The main reason for 
optimally maintaining a lower ratio of international reserves to output in a production 
SOE with investment and productive capital relative to the endowment SOE 
benchmark is as follows. With the capital stock now accumulated via investment and 
potentially used as a pledge to external creditors in obtaining borrowing and therefore 
insuring better against sudden stops, the optimal reserve-to-output ratio is much lower 
relative to an otherwise similar endowment economy in the AK model. As 
depreciation depletes the existing capital stock, opposite to investment, the reversal of 
	 7	
the relationship is not surprising in both the AK and CD models. Whereas the AK 
model can generate endogenously, via policy, persistent capital accummulation 
leading to sustained long-run growth, adding labour as a second factor in a CD 
production function, consistent with a long-run BGP in Neoclassical models of 
exogenous growth and with sustained per capita income growth, results in a roughly 
mid-point optimal reserve-to-output ratio of 5.5%. 
Chapter 3, finally, takes a complementary, statistical approach and examines 
the key theoretically derived determinants of international reserves relative to output 
together with the most common empirically motivated determinants suggested in the 
literature as ‘control variables’ in a dataset of 26 high and low middle income 
economies. For this purpose, we initially estimate a pooled OLS benchmark and a 
panel data fixed effect model to analyse the relative importance of such empirically 
measured determinants of real-world reserve holdings as well as possible country 
specificities. We then use quantile regression techniques to examine the variation in 
these determinants across the reserve holdings distribution in our sample. We 
examine the uniformity of coefficients by several quantile regressions and the overall 
models. Our quantile regression results suggest that there is substantial variation in 
middle income countries in terms of the reserve holdings distribution. Our findings 
from inter-quantile regressions show that there are statistically significant differences 
in share of imports in GDP, investment share of GDP, and short term external debt to 
GDP. 
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Introduction 
 
This thesis is composed of three essays on international reserves, explicitly focusing 
on the role of investment, capital and labour in production SOE models featuring 
technology consistent with the most common endogenous (AK IRS) and exogenous 
(labour-augmenting CD CRS) Neoclassical growth specifications. The theoretical 
chapters 1 and 2 analyse the implications of these two conventional production 
functions from Neoclassical growth theory on the level of optimal reserves relative to 
output. Chapter 3 then extends this analytical work into the empirics of panel data and 
quantile regressions, notably adding typical control variables to the theory-derived 
key determinants. 
Figure 1 shows a snapshot of the relationship between the ratios of investment 
and international reserves, respectively, to real GDP in the sample of 34 middle 
income EMEs used in Jeanne and Rancière (2011), referred to henceforth as JR. This 
figure could serve as a general motivation for the theoretical study undertaken in the 
first two chapters of the thesis. It is insightful to note that while there is a statistically 
significant (p-value of 0.006) positive (0.865) slope coefficient in the JR sample when 
regressing the reserve-to-output ratio on a constant and the investment-to-output ratio, 
just eliminating the two obvious outliers1 (Botswana and China) results in statistical 
insignificance at all conventional levels (p-value of 0.14). This fact demonstrates the 
sensitivity of simple empirical regressions to the outliers in a sample and, hence, the 
importance of analytical results that can be derived in theoretical environments. 
                                                
1	We applied Grubbs’ (1969) test in order to detect outliers of the JR sample using Stata. The test 
results imply that China’s gross fixed capital formation to GDP series show an outlier influences in 
2013. Moreover, Grubbs’ test also implies Botswana’s reserves-to-GDP ratio shows outlier values from 
1985 to 2010.   
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We, therefore, focus on examining analytically the role that investment in 
production SEO models plays in optimal reserve holdings under alternative but 
commonly used technology specifications. In doing so, we make three distinct 
contributions to the literature on international reserves, specific to each of the 
chapters. 
Our first contribution is to study the implications of investment and productive 
capital on optimal international reserves in SOE EMEs and to derive an optimal 
reserves-to-output formula that extends the endowment JR benchmark to the more 
realistic case where, initially, in Chapter 1, capital is the sole factor of production as 
in the AK model of endogenous growth. We refer to this version as the one-factor 
production SOE AK model, or simply the AK model (of endogenous growth). This 
version implies increasing returns to scale (IRS) and is justified on the grounds of the 
ability of the AK model to generate endogenously, via the influence of policy – such 
as subsidies or taxes on investment – on capital accummulation, sustained long-run 
growth observed in the data (Acemoglu, 2009, p. 55; Jones and Vollrath, 2013, p. 
216). We find that the endogenous growth AK model with IRS implies a negative 
relationship between the optimal reserve-to-output ratio and either the investment-to-
output ratio or capital-augmenting (in fact, here sole-factor) technological progress. 
Depending on the calibration of the productivity parameter, the model quantifies the 
optimal ratio of reserves to output at 1.74% for SOEs. 
Our second contribution, in Chapter 2, is to introduce labour as a conventional 
second factor of production, making the specification of technology more general. In 
particular, we switch to a labour-augmenting Cobb-Douglas (CD) production 
function, which embodies alternative assumptions of constant returns to scale (CRS) 
overall – but with diminishing returns to scale (DRS) for each of the two factors, 
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capital and labour – and convergence to a balanced growth path (BGP) in the long 
run. In turn, this version is justified on the grounds of being consistent with a long-run 
BGP in neoclassical models of exogenous growth (Acemoglu, 2009, p. 59) and with 
sustained per capita income growth in these models (Jones and Vollrath, 2013, pp. 36-
37). The second chapter thus focuses on the effects of labour-augmenting productivity 
on the optimal reserves-to-output ratio in a production SOE. Moreover, the alternative 
modelling of the production function, IRS AK versus CRS CD, and the type of 
growth, endogenous versus exogenous, allows us to compare the analytical results in 
chapter 1 (the AK model) with those in chapter 2 (the CD model). Similarly to the 
endogenous growth AK model, we find that in the exogenous growth CD model along 
the BGP labour-augmenting technological progress decreases the optimal reserves-to-
output ratio. Depending on the calibration of the labour-augmenting productivity 
parameter, the CRS CD model quantifies the optimal ratio of reserves to output at 
5.5% in the richer two-factor production SOE model. This roughly three times higher 
ratio of optimal reserve holdings to output arises from the difference in the 
specification of technology in the respective production functions, emphasising the 
sensitivity of optimal reserves to the way technological progress is modelled. This 
ratio is still quite lower than the corresponding one derived in the endowment SOE 
benchmark of Jeanne and Rancière (2011), 9.1%. Our intuition for the result that the 
optimal ratio of international reserves to output in a production SOE with investment 
and productive capital is lower relative to the endowment SOE benchmark can be 
summarised as follows. With the capital stock now accumulated via investment and 
potentially used as a pledge to external creditors in obtaining borrowing and therefore 
insuring better against sudden stops, the optimal reserve-to-output ratio is much lower 
in the AK model relative to an otherwise similar endowment economy. As 
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depreciation depletes the existing capital stock, opposite to investment, the reversal of 
the relationship is not surprising in both the AK and CD models. Whereas 
government policy in the AK model can generate endogenously persistent capital 
accummulation leading to sustained long-run growth, adding labour as a second factor 
in a CD production function, consistent with a long-run BGP in Neoclassical models 
of exogenous growth and with sustained per capita income growth, results in a 
roughly mid-point optimal reserve-to-output ratio of 5.5%. 
Finally, our third contribution, in Chapter 3, consists in complementing the 
key theoretically derived determinants of international reserves relative to output with 
some of the most common empirically motivated determinants suggested in the 
literature as ‘control variables’ in panel data and quantile regression estimation based 
on a dataset of 26 high and low middle income economies. Our main aim is to show 
empirical behaviour of the key theoretical parameters of the first two chapters such as 
growth rate of GDP, the external-debt-to-GDP ratio and probability of a sudden stop 
and the investment rate that was missing from the earlier applied literature, in a 
broader concept including most typical empirical determinants of reserve holding 
such as export volatility, trade openness, the broad money-to-GDP ratio, the volatility 
of nominal effective exchange rate. For this purpose, we initially estimate a pooled 
OLS benchmark and a panel data fixed effect model to analyse the relative 
importance of such empirically measured determinants of real-world reserve holdings 
as well as possible country specificities. We then use quantile regression techniques to 
examine the variation in these determinants across the reserve holdings distribution in 
our sample. We examine the uniformity of coefficients by several quantile regressions 
and the overall models. Our quantile regression results suggest that there is substantial 
variation in middle income countries in terms of the reserve holdings distribution. Our 
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findings from inter-quantile regressions show that there are statistically significant 
differences in import share of GDP, investment share of GDP, and short term debt to 
GDP. 
Each chapter of this thesis can be read as a stand-alone paper. Hence, each 
individual chapter includes its own introduction and a review of the literature 
(although chapter 1 and 2 share mostly a common literature). The aim of this 
introductory chapter is to introduce the overall setting of this thesis. After the third 
chapter, we also offer overall concluding remarks to the thesis outlining some 
directions for future research. 
 
Figure 1: Reserves and Investment Ratio	
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online), and authors’ calculations. Data on 
reserves to GDP ratios and gross capital formation are for 2013 for the 34 middle income countries 
listed in Table 1.2 in Appendix 1.A. 
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Chapter 1: The Optimal Level of International Reserves in a 
Production Small Open Economy: AK Model 
 
Abstract 
One of the most significant current discussions in international macroeconomics is the 
rapid increase in international reserves for emerging market economies (EMEs). 
Recent developments characterised by a perceived excess of reserve holdings in many 
EMEs have heightened the need to revisit analytically and quantitatively the optimal 
level of reserves in terms of real output. Moreover, while there is a huge literature on 
international reserves as an insurance against sudden stops of capital inflows, little is 
known regarding the role of optimal reserves as insurance when a production 
economy with investment is explicitly modelled. The aim of this chapter is to fill in 
this gap in the literature, by extending the endowment benchmark of JR to a 
production economy with endogenous growth based on AK production technology 
and deriving the corresponding formula for the optimal ratio of reserves to output in 
SOEs facing the risk of sudden stops. We find that in for production economies, the 
reserve-to-GDP ratio is negatively related to productive capital and investment and 
positively related to the depreciation rate of capital. With the capital stock now 
accumulated via investment and potentially used as a pledge to external creditors in 
obtaining borrowing and therefore insuring better against sudden stops, the optimal 
reserve-to-output ratio is much lower, 1.74%, relative to an otherwise similar 
endowment economy, 9.1% in JR. As depreciation depletes the existing capital stock, 
opposite to investment, the reversal of the relationship is not surprising. 
 
Keywords: International Reserves, Sudden Stops, Capital Productivity, Investment, 
AK Technology 
JEL Classification: F31, F32, F33, F41 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
International reserves have increased substantially in recent years. Figure 1.1 shows 
that middle-income countries account for nearly a half of this increase. Consequently, 
the accumulation of international reserves in emerging market economies (EMEs) has 
become one of the most debated issues in open-economy macroeconomics (Chinn et 
al., 1999; Aizenman and Marion, 2003; Dooley et al., 2004; Caballero and Panageas, 
2007; Alfaro and Kanczuk, 2009; Durdu et al., 2009; Jeanne and Rancière, 2011; 
Calvo et al., 2012; Dominguez et al., 2012). Have many EMEs, in fact, accumulated 
excessive rather than adequate reserves? And what is an optimal ratio of reserves to 
output in a small open economy (SOE)? The recent literature offers contradictory 
explanations on these questions of immediate policy relevance: in particular, there is 
no consensus on whether the reserve accumulation is driven by self-insurance against 
abrupt reversals of capital flows or new mercantilism (Aizenman and Marion, 2004). 
Basically, two main benefits of large reserve holdings have been emphasized: 
(i) international reserves provide liquidity to smooth consumption (Jeanne and 
Rancière, 2011); (ii) international reserves give a flexibility to manage sizable capital 
outflows in periods of crises (Aizenman et al., 2007). Moreover, it has also been 
argued that reserve policies can help guard away an economy from a crisis or 
contribute to a recovery after a crisis (Aizenman and Marion, 2004; Dominguez et al., 
2012). 
The issue has been discussed under two main approaches: (i) one of them 
rationalises why EMEs hold a high level of reserves as a form of self-insurance 
against ‘sudden stops’2 in capital inflows (Aizenman et al., 2007; Aizenman and 
Marion, 2003; Aizenman and Marion, 2004; Chinn et al., 1999; Dominguez et al., 
                                                
2 Calvo (1998) seems to have coined and interpreted first this term. 
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2012; Dooley et al., 2004; Eichengreen and Mathieson, 2000; Greenspan, 1999); (ii) 
the other examines what the determinants of reserve holdings are and, furthermore, 
what the optimal level of reserves is (Alfaro and Kanczuk, 2009; Caballero and 
Panageas, 2007; Calvo et al., 2013; Durdu et al., 2009; Jeanne and Ranciere, 2006; 
Jeanne and Rancière, 2011). 
Jeanne and Rancière (2011), in particular, have considered the role of optimal 
international reserves as an insurance against sudden stops in capital inflows in an 
endowment SOE, abstracting from physical capital accumulation through investment. 
However, the literature has not yet analysed the same problem in a richer SOE set-up 
that models production and investment explicitly. Our contribution, thus, consists in 
filling in this gap. Indeed, most studies on international reserves have focused on 
other reserve-related issues, such as active reserve management (Aizenman and 
Marion, 2003) or the new type of monetary mercantilism (Aizenman et al., 2007) and 
the optimal level of reserves (Jeanne and Ranciere, 2006; Jeanne and Rancière, 2011). 
Our paper proposes an extension to a production economy of the endowment 
SOE model in Jeanne and Rancière (2011), hereafter JR. More fundamentally, in 
doing so we bring together two strands of literature that have developed 
independently and separately from each other over many years, namely neoclassical 
growth theory of the 1950s and 1960s and the open-economy theory of capital flows 
under the risk of sudden stops since the late 1990s. JR have developed an ‘insurance 
model’ of optimal international reserves where the representative consumer can 
smooth consumption during sudden stops if the central bank holds a stock of 
international reserves. The authors derive a closed-form expression for the optimal 
level of reserves relative to the level of output. They find results broadly consistent 
with the earlier literature: their model predicts a reserve-to-GDP ratio of 9%. Yet, JR 
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suggest that their set-up can be extended in several ways, one of which is to 
incorporate productive capital and investment. In the present paper, we do so with the 
particular aim to explore the implications of such an extended, more realistic set-up 
for the optimal reserves-to-output ratio in EMEs. 
More precisely, to study the effects of investment and production on optimal 
reserves in EMEs, we develop a theoretical framework for a production SOE. In this 
chapter, we derive optimal reserves-to-output where capital is the sole factor of 
production, and we refer to this version as the one-factor production SOE AK model, 
or simply the AK model (of endogenous growth); this version implies increasing 
returns to scale (IRS) and is justified on the grounds of the ability of the AK-model to 
generate endogenously, via the influence of policy – such as subsidies or taxes on 
investment – on capital accummulation, sustained long-run growth (Acemoglu, 2009, 
p. 55; Jones and Vollrath, 2013, p. 216). 
We find that the AK model with IRS suggests a negative relationship between 
the optimal reserve-to-output ratio and capital-augmenting (in fact, sole-factor) 
technological progress. Our calibration implies that the model quantifies the optimal 
ratio of reserves to output as 1.74 % in one-factor production SOEs of the EME type. 
Following JR, our sample consists of 34 middle income countries over the period 
1975 to 2014, and the calibration is based on the mean values for each country across 
years and then the average of all countries. Thus, we do not only present an extension 
of the optimal reserves-to-output formula to an AK production SOE, but also update 
the time range of the dataset up to 2014. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 gives an overview 
of the literature on the optimal level of reserves. Section 1.3 presents an extended 
version of the JR endowment economy model of optimal reserve holding, namely the 
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AK model for a production economy. The results of the calibration are provided in 
section 1.4. Section 1.5 concludes. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 
There is a comprehensive literature on international reserves since at least the 1960s. 
It mainly focuses on two approaches. The first approach studies the determinants of 
reserve holdings, examining the reasons behind reserve accumulation. The second 
approach is concerned with the management of high levels of international reserves. 
The present chapter contributes to the first approach, and we therefore only review 
this strand of the literature. 
 
1.2.1 Earlier Literature on the Determinants of Reserves 
 
 
In the earlier literature, international reserves were seen essentially as a buffer stock, 
and the relationship between reserves and liquidity was in the centre of interest 
(Balogh, 1960; Caves, 1964). Balogh (1960) proposes an economic theory of reserve 
holdings. According to his view, the level of international reserves depends on the 
objective of economic policy and provides liquidity to the economy. Caves (1964) 
defines the liquidity problem as financing the United States (US) deficit, and analyses 
the role of international reserves in potential issues related to fixed exchange-rate 
regimes. Even though both papers try to answer why nations hold reserves, they do 
not explicitly present motives behind holding reserves. 
Such motives were given by Heller (1966), by analogy with the motives for 
holding money in the Keynesian tradition: (i) a transaction motive, (ii) a 
precautionary motive and (iii) a speculative motive. Furthermore, he was the first to 
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propose an optimal reserve function in taking adjustment cost and opportunity cost 
into account. It depends on the marginal propensity to import, the opportunity cost of 
reserves and the balance of payments (BoP) volatility. 
It is widely accepted in the subsequent literature that the above three motives 
are the ‘traditional factors’ of the optimal reserve function. Clark (1970), Kelly 
(1970), and Hamada and Ueda (1977) developed this ‘traditional view’ in terms of 
modifying some assumptions, but their key result remains consistent with Heller 
(1966): the optimal reserve level increases with BoP volatility and decreases with the 
propensity to import and the opportunity cost. 
Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) proposed a buffer stock model for the optimal 
reserve level based on the same two types of costs. The first one is the opportunity 
cost, which can be defined as a comparison of alternative investment returns. The 
second one is the cost of adjustment, which is a cost of reserve depletion. In order to 
determine the optimal level of reserves, both costs are minimized. However, there is a 
negative relationship between them, so the opportunity cost increases when reserves 
are at a high level, whereas a high level of reserves is associated with a lower 
adjustment cost. 
With increasing trade and financial liberalization in the course of the 1990s, 
precautionary demand of holding international reserves has gained more importance 
in international reserve analysis. Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992) introduce the effect 
of sovereign risk on the precautionary demand for holding international reserves. 
They discuss the cost of decreasing the reserve level, which might be a signal of an 
external payment problem for a country with external debt. The authors also point out 
that past defaults are important. If a country had experienced a default in the past, it 
would require holding more reserves to keep its international credibility. 
	 23	
In the wake of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, researchers and 
policymakers have also become concerned with the issue of ‘reserve adequacy’, 
allowing a safeguard for a country from a sudden stop of capital inflows. Some simple 
policy rules have been proposed in order to provide insurance for economies which 
have a risk of vulnerability from such episodes or crises. Feldstein (1999) argues that 
an accumulation of foreign reserves is an insurance against sudden stops of capital 
inflows and capital outflows in EMEs. Greenspan (1999) similarly suggests a measure 
of the ‘optimal’ level of reserves, according to which a country’s reserve level should 
be equal to its short-term external debt (STED). Chinn et al. (1999) compare the Latin 
American countries and the East Asian countries in terms of an insurance model for a 
currency crisis. Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000) analyse the importance of the 
currency composition of international reserves for EMEs along the proposed concepts 
by Feldstein (1999) and Greenspan (1999). 
The accumulation of reserves in the Asian economies after the 1997-1998 
financial crisis, in an attempt to prevent future occurrences of similar major 
disturbances, led to further attention to the potential vulnerabilities of EMEs and the 
role of reserve holdings to mitigate them. One of the main common features of Asian 
EMEs after the 1997-1998 crisis is that most of them have been generating current 
account surpluses. Dooley et al. (2004) develop a theory of the determinants of 
international reserves by also considering the current account (CA). The CA surpluses 
may lead to an appreciation of the domestic currency. Furthermore, a relationship 
between the CA surplus and the demand for reserves could be either negative or 
positive. If a central bank keeps on buying foreign reserves during the current account 
surplus period, it obviously increases the country’s reserve level. 
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On the other hand, a negative relationship between the CA surplus and 
international reserves is presented by Aizenman et al. (2007). According to them the 
CA surplus may be a signal that a country is less exposed to external shocks, and this 
might be a reason for a decrease in reserve levels. If a country runs a CA deficit, it is 
expected that the central bank sells their reserves to purchase domestic currency, 
which causes a decrease in international reserves. 
 
1.2.2 More Recent Literature on the Optimal Level of Reserves 
 
As just outlined, most studies in the field of international reserves have traditionally 
focused on the determinants of reserves and the fundamental trade-off between the 
benefits of holding reserves and its costs. Only a few recent papers have examined the 
optimal level of international reserves. 
Caballero and Panageas (2007) examine the relationship between reserve 
accumulation and sudden stops of capital inflows in a dynamic general equilibrium 
model for EMEs. Given the fact that EMEs run persistent CA deficits to smooth 
consumption intertemporally, they need capital inflows from foreign countries, but 
these inflows are subject to the risk of a sudden stop. The authors calibrate the model 
under this condition and find that insurance strategies aiming at perfect as well as 
imperfect risk sharing may both lead to a high reduction of reserve accumulation. 
Durdu et al. (2009) propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
model in order to implement a quantitative assessment of the ‘new mercantilism’ 
under two theoretical models; a one-sector endowment economy and a two-sector 
production economy. In their analysis, three key factors are changes in the business 
cycle volatility of output, financial globalization, and self-insurance against a sudden 
stop. They derive a formula for the optimal level of reserves and find that financial 
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globalization and the risk of a sudden stop are the main reasons behind reserve 
accumulation. These authors also find that CA surpluses and undervalued exchange 
rates are two important factors of the large build-up of reserves in response to 
financial globalization or sudden stop risk. 
Based on a different DSGE SOE model, Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) argue that 
the optimal level of reserves is zero, since a country can protect itself by defaulting on 
its external debt instead of accumulating reserves. There is a large volume of 
published studies on international reserve holdings that take the level of external debt 
as given. In order to examine the implications of the joint decision on holding 
reserves and sovereign debt, the authors suggest that an alternative option is to 
decrease the level of sovereign debt and hence reduce the probability of, and the 
negative effect of, a potential crisis. 
The issue of the optimal international reserve level has also been explored by 
Calvo et al. (2012) within a statistical model where reserves affect the probability of a 
sudden stop and output costs. The global financial environment is a key factor in their 
analysis, as the expected return from reserve holdings is conditional on it. In addition, 
the opportunity cost of reserve holdings is calculated as the spread of public-sector 
bonds over the interest earned from holding reserves. The optimal level of reserves is 
then determined as the one that maximizes expected return net of cost, given global 
financial conditions. One of the main contributions of the paper is that the authors 
endogenize the probability of sudden stops and the costs of a crisis. 
JR (2011) present an ‘insurance model against sudden stops’ for an 
endowment SOE. The optimal level of reserves depends on the key determinants of 
reserve holdings, such as the probability and size of sudden stops, consumers’ risk 
aversion, the opportunity cost of reserves, and potential output growth. Their 
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calibration results show that the optimal level of reserves relative to GDP is 9% for 34 
middle-income countries over the period of 1975-2003. However, depending on 
parameters, the optimal level of reserves could be larger or smaller for individual 
cases. The JR model differs from the above mentioned models of optimal reserves in 
several aspects. Firstly, JR provide a closed-form formula for the optimal level of 
reserves in terms of the level of output, whereas Caballero and Panageas (2007) and 
Durdu et al. (2009) solve their models numerically. Secondly, JR analyse the optimal 
level of reserves as an insurance against sudden stops rather than precautionary 
savings or the mercantilist motive. 
 
1.2.3 Literature on Capital, Productivity, Growth and Reserves 
 
 
The earlier literature (Heller, 1966; Hamada and Ueda, 1977; Frenkel and Jovanovic, 
1981; and Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb, 1992) derives optimal reserve formulas using a 
cost-benefit approach. Moreover, the opportunity cost of holding reserves is described 
as a difference between the return on capital and on reserves. In other words, the 
marginal productivity of capital enters the optimal reserve formula through the 
definition of the opportunity cost of holding international reserves. Edwards (1985) 
discusses the issue and defines the opportunity cost of holding reserves alternatively, 
as a difference between the interest rate on the debt of a country and the return on 
reserves. Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992) accept this idea only when the marginal 
borrowing rate equals or exceeds the marginal productivity of capital. These authors 
claim that in reality the marginal productivity of capital exceeds the borrowing cost 
because of market imperfections. However, with increasing financial globalization, 
the opportunity cost of reserve holdings is better measured as in Edwards (1985), by 
the difference between the interest rate paid on external liabilities of a country and the 
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lower return on its reserve holdings (García and Soto, 2004; Rodrik, 2006; JR, 2011). 
Accordingly, many recent studies on international reserves optimality ignore the 
relationship between capital productivity and reserve holdings. 
However, another strand of research has indeed been trying to explain the 
relationship between productivity, capital accumulation, growth and international 
reserves. Bonfiglioli (2008) analyses the effects of financial globalization on 
economic growth in terms of total factor productivity (TFP) and capital accumulation. 
He shows that financial globalization has a positive effect on productivity. However, 
his empirical study also finds no direct relationship between financial globalization 
and capital accumulation. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) argue that an improvement 
in productivity gains larger than increasing capital accumulation when analysing the 
relationship between capital accumulation, TFP and financial openness. Kose et al. 
(2009) examine the relationship between financial openness and TFP growth. The 
authors find that capital account openness has a positive effect on TFP growth. 
Mourmouras and Russel (2009) investigate the wisdom behind the large 
reserve holding in terms of investment, capital liquidation and short-term liabilities 
for a SOE. The authors suggest that capital liquidation and short-term debt are good 
for economies in terms of increasing investment and higher real wages3 for workers in 
good times. On the other hand, capital inflows may cause more financial instability 
when a country is hit by a sudden stop. In order to prevent a country against a sudden 
stop, the authors suggest to increase international reserves. By accumulating a high 
level of reserves, central banks can eliminate or decrease the negative effect of capital 
liquidation on wage variability and workers’ welfare. 
                                                
3 Mourmouras and Russel (2009) explain the reason of higher real wages in terms of a higher capital 
intensity ratio. 
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Cheng (2015) studies a dynamic open economy model in order to analyse the 
role of domestic financial underdevelopment in the accumulation of reserves. 
Showing the needs of domestic saving instruments for emerging market firms which 
have an external credit constraint, he describes the role of central banks as a financial 
intermediary: central banks provide liquidity to firms relaxing the credit constraint. In 
order to decrease the level of reserves he suggests increasing financial market 
deepness domestically. His paper is based on three stylized facts of EMEs. Firstly, 
these economies experienced fast economic growth and accumulated a high level of 
reserves. The positive relationship between the rate of economic growth and the level 
of international reserves can be seen as part of a ‘catch-up’ strategy for EMEs. 
Secondly, these economies have underdeveloped domestic financial markets. 
Therefore, they require external financing. Lastly, there is a big persistent difference 
between gross domestic savings and domestic loans in some EMEs. To shed light on 
these facts, Cheng (2015) argues that foreign reserves affect economic growth via 
fixed capital formation. Using Granger causality tests, he finds evidence of the 
relationship between the growth of reserves and gross fixed capital information. 
Benigno and Fornaro (2012) present a model for fast growing EMEs which 
run CA surpluses, hold a high level of reserves and experience capital inflows. The 
authors analyse the joint behaviour of private and public capital inflows in EMEs 
indicating differences between the tradable and non-tradable sectors. They suggest 
that by holding a high level of reserves governments have an important instrument for 
growth strategies in relation to growth externalities and financial stabilization. The 
key mechanism is that an increase in reserves leads to real depreciation4 and to a 
reallocation of production towards the tradable sector, which increases the use of 
                                                
4 Rodrik (2006) provides evidence on this mechanism. He shows that real depreciations stimulate 
economic growth in developing countries. 
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imported inputs, the absorption of foreign knowledge and productivity growth. 
However, this mechanism depends on the imperfect substitutability of private and 
public capital flows. 
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) examine the neoclassical framework of the 
growth model which implies that higher productivity growth attracts more foreign 
capital inflows. However, the authors find the opposite relationship to hold 
empirically in the data for developing countries. They call this the ‘allocation puzzle’5 
and propose a solution, involving the interaction of growth, saving and international 
reserve accumulation. They show that the allocation puzzle is much more related to 
saving and the behaviour of capital flows (generally, the accumulation of reserves) 
than to investment. 
 
1.3 Optimal Level of Reserves with Deterministic AK 
Technology: Sustained Endogenous Growth 
 
In this subsection, an AK type growth model is employed to examine the effect of 
productive capital and investment on international reserve holding. All the 
assumptions of the JR model are maintained, but now an AK production function is 
added to the model. The two main contributions of such an extension are that the AK 
technology allows to consider: (i) physical capital accumulation; and (ii) the influence 
of productivity in the modified optimal reserves formula. 
 
 
                                                
5 Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) argue that public capital flows and the accumulation of reserves play 
an important role in creating the allocation puzzle. 
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1.3.1 Assumptions on the Optimal Level of Reserves under the AK Model 
 
Following JR, we focus on the optimal level of reserves relative to the level of output 
that is perceived as insurance for a SOE against losing access to the international 
credit market. A representative domestic agent, or a private sector, is assumed, as well 
as a domestic government. There is also an international representative agent, referred 
to as foreign insurers or the rest of the world (RoW), who provide international 
reserves to the country. The representative domestic agent in the SOE produces a 
single (composite) good, which is consumed or invested as physical capital 
domestically as well as consumed abroad (as SOE exports). The model is set out in 
discrete time with infinite horizon, using the subscript t = 0, 1, 2, … Apart from the 
risk of sudden stops in capital inflows, there is no other source of uncertainty. In that 
sense, the country faces a risk of international liquidity problems. 
As in JR, the domestic private sector consists of a continuum of atomistic and 
identical infinitely-lived consumers. Their intertemporal utility !" is written as 
 
where ( denotes the constant (world) interest rate, the period utility function ? #"@A  
is assumed to be of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) type, with CRRA 
parameter ) ≥ 0 and # being aggregate consumption, 
 
with ? # = log #  for ) = 1. 
Consumers maximise their current consumption subject to the budget 
constraint which now includes investment in physical capital, 
 !" = I" 1 + ( KA? #"@AALM,…,@P 	  (1) 
 ? # = #QKR1 − ) ,							) ≠ 1 (2) 
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where $" is domestic output, %" is investment in physical capital domestically in order 
to increase the capital stock and next-period output, &" is newly-contracted external 
debt in t with a one-period maturity only and '" is a net transfer from the government 
in t. As in JR, external debt accumulated in t-1 has to be repaid in t at	(, 1 + ( &"KQ, 
and default in paying back external debt as well as foreign lending by the SOE are 
assumed away. Differently from JR, investment in physical capital provides a third 
channel of saving in any period t, in addition to the net indebtedness of the SOE to the 
RoW, &" − 1 + ( &"KQ, and to the domestic government (or the public sector), 
entering via the net transfer, '". It is perhaps easier to see the implications of our 
extension to a production SOE by writing disposable income of the domestic private 
sector in t, U$", compactly as: U$" ≡ $" + &" − 1 + ( &"KQ + '". 
 
Then, the SOE private-sector budget constraint (3) can now be re-written as 
 
and, hence, the SOE private-sector saving in physical capital is defined, as standard, 
by 
 
 
As in neoclassical growth theory, it is common to assume that all firms have 
an identical production function. With AK technology, the aggregate production 
function is 
 
As in the JR model, there are two states in the economy: the normal state (denoted by 
a superscript X) or a crisis state interpreted as a sudden stop (denoted by superscript 
 	#" = $" − %" + &" − 1 + ( &"KQ + '" (3) 
 	#" = U$" − %"; (3’) 
 	%" = -" ≡ U$" − 	#". (4) 
 $" = Z /" = */". (5) 
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.). Furthermore, following neoclassical growth theory, let: (i) investment in physical 
capital be a constant proportion of total output in normal times, 
 
where s is a constant saving rate; and (ii) the increase in the physical capital stock (net 
investment) in any current period t equals the difference between new investment and 
depreciated capital, 
 
where a constant proportion of the capital stock 0 is assumed to depreciate each 
period. 
In this first production SOE model version featuring endogenous growth under 
AK technology in the present chapter, we assume that there is no population growth. 
From (6), using (7) to write investment and (5) to write output, we can express the 
(constant) domestic saving rate in physical capital as, 
 
In line with the AK model, we further assume that: (i) capital grows at a 
constant net rate 12, 
 
and (ii) that the growth rate of the economy equals the growth rate of capital, 1 = 12, 
The latter assumption is shown to be the condition for sustainable growth in the AK 
technology model. 
Using the AK technology to replace output and equation (7) and (9), we obtain 
 	%"[$"[ = s, (6) 
 ∆/"@Q = 	%"[ − 0/", (7) 
 . = ∆/"@Q + 0/"*/"  (8) 
 /"@Q = 1 + 12 /"; (9) 
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Then, the gross growth rate of the capital stock is, as standard in neoclassical 
growth theory, 
And, therefore, the net growth rate of the capital stock is,  
 
We assume that the capital stock does not grow in sudden stop episodes. 
Hence, g^ = 0, so that K`@Qa : Ka` = K`, which implies that in crisis times in the AK 
model, sA = δ. Then, we obtain a condition for investment in sudden stop episodes, 
In this model, one of the critical assumptions is related to newly-contracted 
one-period ahead external debt, &". How much can a SOE borrow from foreign 
lenders? There should be some limit on the amount of output that can be guaranteed 
by the domestic private sector to foreign creditors. In the JR model, this restriction is 
given by the condition that the external debt must be completely paid back in the next 
period, which requires: 
where Z(/"@Q)	[			 is trend output in period t+1 and 4"	is a time-varying parameter. 
The economy can only borrow according to this rule; hence α`	 indicates the warranty 
of next-period domestic output to external lenders. Considering that the agents know 
the value of α` and F(K`@Q)	i			in any current period t, condition (13) states that 
external debt in period t is default-free as long as (13) fulfilled. We follow JR in 
assuming that the time-varying parameter α` as an exogenous variable: because of the 
 /"@Q = .*/" + 1 − 0 /" (9’) 
 /"@Q/" = 1 + 12 = 1 + .* − 0 
 
(10) 
 12 = .* − 0 (11) 
 %"j = 0/"j 
 
(12) 
 1 + ( &" ≤ 4"Z(/"@Q)	[			 (13) 
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possibility of sudden stops, the rigidity of the consumer’s external debt borrowing 
constraint can fluctuate over time and α` can be seen as a penalty for domestic agents 
if they default on their debts. 
In the non-crisis state, output increases by a fixed rate 1 and the economy can 
guarantee a constant portion of the output, 
 
 
On the other hand, when the economy faces a sudden stop, domestic output 
decreases by a constant fraction 6 below its long-run growth path, and guaranteed 
output goes down to zero: 
 
 
Due to normalization, the guaranteed output does not drop below a positive 
level. The sum of the time-varying parameter and the output loss parameter is 
assumed lower than unity, 4 + 6 < 1, in order to secure that the domestic private 
sector does not have difficulty to pay back all the debt during the crisis. The interest 
rate on external debt repayment is assumed to be higher than the growth rate of SOE’s 
output (itself equal to the growth rate of physical capital), ( > 1, to hold the private 
sector’s intertemporal income limited as in JR. 
We follow JR in also assuming that after a sudden stop the capital inflow 
converges to its pre-crisis pattern within a certain number of periods, n. Moreover, the 
country returns to the normal state, X, in period t+n+1. In reality, a country would 
gain access to international liquidity as in its pre-crisis level in more than one year, if 
a sudden stop hits the economy in the current period t. Therefore a ‘sudden stop 
 Z(/")	[ 	= 1 + 1 "Z(/"KQ) (14) 
 4"[ = 4 (15) 
 Z(/")	j 				= 1 − 6 Z(/")	[						 (16) 
 			4"j = 0	 (17) 
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phase’ can be defined as the length o, o + n , as in the JR model. In other words, 
matching the various times of a crisis stage ." = .M, .Q, … . .p, in a specific period o 
the country might be either in the non-crisis state,	." = X, or in the crisis state of n +1, which are the substates of n + 2 phases. 
As in the JR model, the dynamics of external debt depends on the dynamics of 
output. However, in our extension here output is determined by capital accumulation 
rather than given as endowment. Therefore, when the dynamics of domestic output 
during the sudden stop is described, the dynamics of the external debt is also defined: 
 
 
where r = 0,1, … , s. In both equations (18) and (19), 6(r) and 4(r) are exogenously 
determined since they depend on r. Recalling equations (16) and (17), we know that 6 0 = 6	and 4 0 = 0 for r = 0, as in the JR model. Furthermore, it is assumed that 
the SOE converges to its pre-crisis pattern monotonously, because 6 r , is non-
negative, 6 r ≥ 0 and decline in r, whereas 4(r) is also non-negative,	4(r) ≥ 0, but 
increasing in r. When the crisis ends, the private sector can be financed by 
international liquidity as in pre-crisis periods, so there will be no restriction to access 
foreign markets, hence, 4 n = 4, as in JR. 
In our model version with physical capital and AK technology outlined thus 
far, sudden stops have negative effects on consumption and investment decisions of 
domestic consumers, and therefore reduce their welfare. Economic crises reduce trend 
consumption because consumers’ elasticity of intertemporal substitution in 
consumption is bounded. Moreover, it causes a reduction of domestic output which 
implies a decrease the consumers’ intertemporal income (see Jeanne and Rancière, 
 Z(>"@t)	j 				= 1 − 6 r Z(>"@t)	[,	 (18) 
 				4"@tj = 4 r , (19) 
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2011). It is obvious that a reduction in domestic output and an abrupt fall in capital 
inflows lead to a strong decrease in economic activity during the crisis state and so 
consumption goes down sharply (as in JR). 
Eventually, consumption increases as foreign capital flows return into the 
economy after the sudden stop. However, investment continues to decrease after the 
sudden stop. Figure 1.2 illustrates this in five-year event periods. There might be 
many possible explanations for the persistent effect of sudden stops on investment, 
such as increasing costs of investment, difficulty to find foreign funds for investment, 
or the preference to invest in more stable economies. 
The second domestic agent of the economy is the government – or, 
equivalently, the monetary(-fiscal) authority – of the SOE, which plays a critical role 
in the JR model and in our extensions. The task of the government in this set-up is to 
provide smooth domestic consumption between normal and crisis states. To 
implement such policy, the government has as a tool what JR term ‘reserve insurance 
contracts’. Introducing investment in physical capital in our extensions does not affect 
the government, and we therefore keep all assumptions related to it and its transfers as 
in JR. Yet, for completeness, we briefly describe the behaviour of the government 
next. 
Following the JR model, a reserve insurance contract is a simple contract 
between the government and foreign insurers. The aim of the government is to protect 
domestic agents from the case of a sudden reversal in capital flows; therefore, the 
government forgoes some funds today in order to gain capital access during the 
crisis.6 In this sense, reserve insurance contracts embody the trade-offs in reserve 
management, and the mechanism is as follows. Firstly, the government announces a 
                                                
6 This could be seen as the cost of reserves and JR show that this kind of insurance should be financed 
by long-term liabilities. 
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settlement with external creditors in period 0. Then, the external fund providers 
receive a payment 8" from the monetary authority in period t. This process continues 
until a crisis occurs. Once the crisis started at time t, the economy obtains a fund 9". 
After the sudden stop occurs, the monetary authority might sign a new reserve 
insurance deal with foreign insurers when the sudden stop phase ends.7 
The government’s role can be seen in the budget constraint (3) since it shifts 
the funds coming from the agreement with foreign investors to the private sector as 
follows; if the country is in the non-crisis stage, 
 
however, if a sudden stop arises, the government secures a payment in the form of, 
 
Equation (21) shows the government gain during the sudden stop of capital inflows. 
The economy earns 9" from foreign insurers, but should also effect the last payment 
of the reserve insurance contract, 8", within the duration of the sudden stop. Thus, the 
transmission of the government access to international liquidity is captured by the 
difference between 9" and 8", as in JR. 
There is no change either in foreign insurers’ participation condition once we 
incorporate physical capital and investment. Therefore, all assumptions regarding 
foreign insurers are kept as in JR. For completeness, we briefly describe their 
behaviour next. 
The role of external creditors is to supply international liquidity to the 
economy during the sudden stop via the reserve contracts. This definition requires a 
                                                
7 Since the time of the crisis is unknown, an insurance contract signed in period 0 must be specified as 
an infinite sequence of conditional payments 8", 9" "LQ,…,@P (see JR). 
	
 		'"[ = −8";			 (20) 
 '"j = 9" − 8".	 (21) 
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condition that foreign creditors should agree on the price of the government contracts. 
This is a critical parameter in the JR model which shows the condition of foreign 
insurers’ participation. The marginal utility of funds for the investors at date t is 
denoted by :". As in JR, it is more expensive in the crisis than in the normal state: 
 
The price of insurance depends on the ratio between :"j and :"[. For simplicity, the JR 
model assumes that the price parity of funds in normal times to funds in the sudden 
stop episode is fixed and equal to or less than one, which we follow: 
The JR model considers external investors as being perfectly competitive and 
as sharing the same time discount rate with the domestic private sector. Under these 
assumptions foreign insurers supply any ‘reserve insurance contract’ 8", 9" "LQ,…,@P 
whose present discounted value is non-negative, of the form, 
 
1.3.2 A Formula for the Optimal Level of Reserves under the AK Model 
 
 
The production SOE relies on self-insurance against sudden stops by choosing the 
right amount of international reserves. The advantage of the intentional parsimony of 
the AK model version introduced thus far is that it allows for a closed-form solution 
 :"j ≥ :"[ (22) 
 ; = :"[:"j ≤ 1 
 
 
(23) 
 u"@P"LQ 1 − 7 "KQ 1 − 7 8":"[ − 7 9" − 8" :"j ≥ 0										    (24) 
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for optimal reserves as a ratio of output and related analytical insights, provided that 
the borrowing constraint (13) is binding.8 
Due to the above assumption, the economy’s short-term debt to output ratio is 
constant in non-crisis time. The short-term external debt (STED) to GDP ratio is 
denoted by < 
 
To provide smooth consumption, the government maximises private sector’s 
intertemporal utility (1) subject to constraints (3), (6), (12), (20), (21), the binding 
credit constraint (13) and external creditors’ participation condition (24). 
where v is the shadow cost of constraint (24), and the normal state consumption is 
given by, 
 
while the sudden stop episode consumption is given by 
 
                                                
8 If the constraint is not binding, a closed-form solution is not possible. Moreover, condition (13) 
implies that there is no precautionary savings in the model, since the reserve insurance contract plays a 
substitution role to the precautionary savings. 
 < = &"[*/"[ = 1 + .* − 01 + ( 	4 (25) 
 & = u"(1 − 7)"@P"LQ 1 − 7 ? #"[ + 7? #"j + v 1 − 7 8":"[ − 7(9" −8"):"j   
 
  (26) 
 #"[ = */" − .*/" + <*/" − 4*/" − 8" 
 
 
 
(27) 
 	#"[ = 1 − . − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 */" − 8" 
 
 
 #"j = 1 − 6 */" − 0/" − 4*/"+9" − 8" 
 
 
(28) 
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The first-order conditions imply 
 
Equation (29) shows that the domestic consumption can be substituted at the 
same rate between the normal and crisis state by the private sector and external 
creditors, as in the JR model. If we simply rewrite (29) and the external creditors’ 
binding condition (13), we can describe the government transfers 8", in form of, 
 
 
Now we can solve the first-order condition if the borrowing constraint (13) is 
always binding. Assuming these conditions meet, we can express the optimal level of 
international reserves relative to output under the AK production economy as the ratio w ≡ 9"/Z(/")[, in form of, 
 
where, 6 is the output loss in the first period of capital outflows, < is the STED to 
GDP ratio,	; is the price ratio of funds in different states (normal times and sudden 
stop episodes), ( is the interest rate, . is the saving rate of the economy, 0 is the 
depreciation rate of physical capital, * is the technology level of the economy,	7 is a 
crisis probability, and ) is the CRRA. 
 #"j = −6 − 0* − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 */" + 9" − 8" 	 
 
 			?y #"[ = ;?y #"j 	 (29) 
 8" = 77 + ;(1 − 7)9" (30) 
 w∗ = 9"*/" = 6 + < − 1 − ;
QR 1 − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 + 0* − ;QR.1 − 77 + ;(1 − 7) 1 − ;QR  
 
(31) 
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The optimal level of international reserves in terms of output for a SOE 
derived under an AK production function, equation (31), features some determinants 
that are common with the original JR endowment SOE model. For example, it is 
positively related to the STED-GDP ratio, <; to the output cost of sudden stops, 6; to 
the probability of a sudden stop,	7. 
In addition to these determinants, we have three new ones which are related to 
the production structure of the economy. One such new determinant under an AK 
technology is the investment rate of economy, .. It affects negatively the optimal 
reserves-output ratio. A second additional determinant is the depreciation rate of 
capital, 0. It influences positively the reserve ratio. The third additional determinant 
under the AK technology is the productivity level, *, which influences the optimal 
reserve ratio negatively. As we discussed in the model assumptions, the growth rate of 
economy is equal to the growth rate of capital stock, and equation (11) gives the 
parameters of the growth rate of capital stock where it equals investment rate of 
economy times capital productivity minus the depreciation rate of physical capital. 
Therefore, if we follow the joint sign of these parameters, we can see that the 
endogenous growth rate of AK technology is also negatively related with the optimal 
reserves-output ratio.      
In order to compare our extended SOE model with AK technology to the 
original JR endowment SOE model, we can rewrite our formula for the optimal level 
of reserves in terms of GDP as follows; 
 
 			6 + < − w∗ = QK{|}QK ~~Ä(|Å~) QK{|} 1 − 4 − 6 − ÇÉ + ;|}. + 6 + < { QKÑÑ@{ QKÑ    (32) 
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By inspection of equation (32), we can see lots of similarities with the analogous 
expression in JR, their equation (19); yet, our extended model derives an additional 
term, ÇÉ + ;|}. , which results from of adding investment and productive capital 
under our AK technology assumption. 
To begin with the similarities, first, the left hand side (LHS) of equation (32) 
is the same as in the JR model. Secondly, the case of ; = 1, which implies that 
external insurers do not have preferences between the crisis and non-crisis states, 
collapses our equation (32) in the same way as it collapses equation (19) in JR, 
making the right hand side (RHS) zero. In this special case of full insurance, the 
economy’s reserve ratio is equal to the aggregate size of the output loss and the 
STED-GDP ratio, 6 + <	 . Thirdly, the influence of risk aversion is the same in both 
models because optimal reserves depend positively on ). A fourth similarity is the 
response to the Greenspan-Guidotti rule, which states that reserves should cover the 
STED, i.e., w = <. So, the only case when ; = 1 and there is no loss in output, i.e., 6 = 0, implies	w = < (similarly to JR). 
The key difference between the JR endowment benchmark and our AK 
production model lies in the role of investment and productive capital, captured in 
(32) by the depreciation rate of physical capital, 0, the investment rate of economy, . , 
and the productivity level, *. Firstly, a higher depreciation rate in SOEs requires a 
quicker replacement of the capital stock. Then, these economies (as production mostly 
depends on imported goods) might need to finance their production and, hence, need 
access to external borrowing. In order to provide insurance for the private sector 
during the sudden stop, a higher depreciation rate implies a higher reserve to GDP 
ratio. 
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Secondly, an increase in the investment rate . leads to a decrease in optimal 
reserve holding. Since the investment rate equals the saving rate and if investment is 
financed by a higher proportion of domestic savings, then the economy needs less 
foreign capital to insure itself against a sudden stop of capital flows. This theoretical 
result also attests that investment still could be thought as an opportunity cost of 
reserves (see Rodrik, 2006). 
Thirdly, a higher productivity of capital * leads to a lower reserve to GDP 
ratio. Therefore, not only investment decreases the reserve to GDP ratio, but also 
productivity (of capital, in the AK model) plays an important role in reducing optimal 
reserve holding for SOEs relative to the endowment benchmark in JR. We could think 
of a mechanism working in the opposite direction of capital stock depletion via the 
depreciation rate. As long as the private sector employs a sufficiently productive AK 
technology, this might decrease the need for international borrowing compared to a 
less productive AK technology or to the JR endowment benchmark. 
1.4 Calibration 
In this section, we analyse some quantitative implications of our AK production SOE 
model using data for 34 middle income countries9 from 1975 to 2014. In order to 
show the overall behaviour of the model parameters, domestic consumption10 is 
defined in terms of domestic output, financial account, investment, income transfers 
and change in reserves, 
                                                
9 In order to be able to make a direct comparison between our AK production SOE model and the 
endowment benchmark of Jeanne and Rancière (2011), we used the same sample of 34 countries, 
extending the original dataset to 2014. They classified these as middle income countries according to 
the World Bank’s classification. However, this classification has changed (the sample includes 7 high 
income countries, i.e., Argentina, Korea, Hungary, Poland, Chile, the Czech Republic and Uruguay) 
after the publication of their paper. Following JR, we also exclude major oil-producing countries from 
our dataset. 
10 Equation (33) can also be interpreted as domestic absorption since domestic absorption equals the 
sum of domestic consumption and investment, U" = #" + %".	
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where Z*" is the financial account, %Ö" is the income and transfers from abroad and Δ9" shows the change in reserves. A sudden stop is defined as an unexpected 
decrease in financial account which leads a decrease in domestic consumption and it 
might cause a decrease in domestic output or it can be adjusted by international 
reserves (see Jeanne and Rancière, 2011). Equation (33) shows the link with our 
budget constraint in the sudden stop as, 
 
where á denotes a pure risk premium11 and might be interpreted as an opportunity of 
holding reserves. 
Our extended model to AK production allows us to describe the dynamics of 
output with investment during sudden stop episodes. Figure 1.2 illustrates a novel 
feature of this output dynamics driven obviously by investment dynamics relative to 
the JR endowment benchmark abstracting from investment. The average behaviour of 
equation (34) in a five-year event window is depicted in the figure, where the middle 
observation ‘0’ labels a sudden stop year. A sudden stop is identified as a more than 
5% decrease in the ratio of capital inflows to GDP, /*"/$", relative to the preceding 
year, following Guidotti et al. (2004) and Jeanne and Rancière (2011). Although all 
components of equation (34) display a similar pattern with the JR model, investment 
adds inertia in its own adjustment and, hence, in the adjustment of output. Both 
investment and output in our AK model continue to decrease after the sudden stop 
                                                
11 Because it has no role in affecting productivity and investment, the opportunity cost of holding 
reserves is not described in this model. However, in order to make a comparison between our AK 
production model and the JR endowment benchmark, we follow their methodology in expressing 8" =(7 + á)9". 
#" = $" − %" + Z*" + %Ö" − Δ9" (33) 
 #"jàâ = (1 − 6)$"[äâ − 0/"jãâ + (−&"KQ)åÉâ + [−(&"KQ − 7 + á 9"]ãèâ − (−9")êëâ   (34) 
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period, featuring higher persistence, whereas all other components of equation (34) 
start recovery after period ‘0’, as is the case with output when investment and capital 
are not modelled in JR. The difficulties in accessing international borrowing facilities 
after the sudden stop and the capital outflows during the crisis make the private sector 
vulnerable, and this affects investment decisions. Therefore, a recovery may not be 
seen in investment and output in the first year of the sudden stop. 
The countries in our sample and the years in which they had a sudden stop12 
are presented in Table 1.2. Even though we use the same sample of countries as JR 
(2011), our sudden stop years were defined applying their methodology to our 
updated dataset, and therefore some minor differences in the sudden stop episodes by 
country are observed. Moreover, when we calculate capital inflows in our dataset 
mostly World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI, online) was used, 
whereas JR relied on IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
Our calibration of the key parameters entering the optimal reserve-to-output 
ratio is given in Table 1.3. We used equations (31), (33) and (34) above. Furthermore, 
we recomputed some of the JR model parameters in our updated sample (such as the 
output loss, the size of the sudden stop, the crisis probability) since they play similar 
roles in our AK technology model. We did not change some JR parameters (such as 
the interest rate, the price of non-crisis dollar and the CRRA) as they have no distinct 
novel role in our model but are necessary for a comparison between both models. 
                                                
12Capital inflows-capital account over GDP ratio- measured as a ratio of the current account deficit 
minus reserve accumulation to GDP as in JR. Jordan and Poland show most noticeable differences with 
JR’s sudden stop years, because of data limitations, since IFS 2016, and WDI do not have data for 
these countries in those years when a sudden stop can be observed. In JR, Poland has two sudden stop 
years but Jordan has more than 5 years. Therefore, our calibration might show 1 or 2 % differences. In 
order to make better comparison between our model and JR model, we tried to calibrate our parameters 
similar to JR as much as we can. 
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The unconditional probability of a crisis, 7, is 9.8% per year which is rounded 
to 10%. Our calibration of 7 is consistent with JR (2011), as they found 7=0.1 (with a 
range between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 0.24). 
The STED-GDP ratio, interpreted by JR as the size of a sudden stop, <, is 
calibrated at the average level of the ratio of capital inflows to GDP, +Éâäâ −+ÉâÅ|äâÅ| , over our sample of crisis episodes, and is almost 9.9%, which is rounded to 
10%. JR also set <	to 10% (range 0 to 0.30). 
Output loss, 6, was calibrated at the average difference between the GDP 
growth rate one period before the crisis and the growth rate in the first year of the 
capital outflows. We observed a 2% decrease in GDP growth rates on average in the 
first year of capital outflows and a 4% decrease when we restrict the sample to 
countries that suffered an output reduction; however, it shows large variation across 
countries. JR assume13 6= 0.065 and we use their calibration in order to make more 
consistent comparison of our model with theirs. 
The risk free short term interest rate, (, the risk aversion parameter,	), and the 
price ratio of funds in dollars,14 ;, are calibrated as in Jeanne and Rancière (2011) at 
5%, 2, 0.855, respectively. 
The role played by the investment rate, ., and the depreciation rate of physical 
capital, 0, constitute our main contribution to extending the optimal reserve formula 
in JR to a production SOE. We found the average level of the investment rate to be 
equal to 24%, which is the sample average of the investment share in total income in 
our data from the Penn World Tables (PWT, 7.0). Therefore, we calibrated the 
                                                
13 JR calculate output decreases by 4% on average in the first year of sudden stops and by 9% when 
they only focus attention on subset of the countries in which output fell. Then they take the average of 
two estimates and set output loss to 6.5%. 
14 Which is based on the calculation of the opportunity cost of reserves from JR.	
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investment rate at 24%. Following the growth accounting literature, we set the 
depreciation rate of physical capital to 6% per annum (Caselli, 2005; Gourinchas and 
Jeanne, 2013). 
In addition to the determinants of optimal reserves in the JR endowment 
benchmark, our SOE model extended to investment and production also includes a 
key technology parameter, *, which is calibrated based on model assumptions, as 
described next. For simplification, and following Caselli (2005), we denote í2 = *+ in 
the AK model, where = is equal to GDP per worker in the data and > is capital per 
worker in the data. Our sample shows average GDP per worker equal $15141 from 
PWT (7.0). In line with Caselli (2005), we found capital per worker, >, is 2.49 times 
higher than GDP per worker. Then, we calculated *+ to be equal to 0.4. 
Our extended model highlighting an AK technology results in a lower optimal 
reserve-to-output ratio, 1.74%, relative to the JR endowment benchmark, 9.1% and 
commonly accepted reserve adequacy indicators15 (i.e. international reserves as % of 
total external debt, broad money as % of international reserves and international). 
Thus, when taking into account investment and productive capital, countries would 
need less reserves. Our model implies that the optimal level of international reserves 
to GDP is a decreasing function of the investment rate. Furthermore, higher 
productivity (of capital, here in the AK model) implies a lower reserve-to-output ratio 
too. In other words, capital productivity decreases the need of higher international 
reserves relative to the JR endowment benchmark. 
Figure 1.3 illustrates the relationship between the optimal level of 
international reserves and its determinants for the AK model. This figure also shows 
the sensitivity of our results to the key determinants of the optimal reserve-to-output 
                                                
15 Figures 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 show commonly accepted reserve adequacy indicators for our sample 
according to their continents in appendix 1.A.1.  
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ratio. It is based on the optimal reserve formula (31) and the reported calibrations. As 
can be seen in the respective panels of Figure 1.3, our results suggest a positive 
relationship between the reserve-to-GDP ratio and some of its key determinants, such 
as the size of sudden stop, the output cost of a sudden stop, the probability of sudden 
stops, the interest rate, the coefficient of relative risk aversion and – in our extension 
to an AK production – also on the depreciation rate of capital. On the other hand, and 
perhaps most importantly given the aims of the present chapter, we were able to 
uncover the novel findings that the optimal reserve-to-GDP ratio depends negatively 
on other determinants, notably those that arise when modelling a production 
economy, here under an AK technology, namely the investment rate of economy and 
capital productivity. Figure 1.3 also shows the negative relationship between the 
endogenous growth rate and optimal reserve-to-output ratio. Although it does not 
appear in the optimal reserve formula (31) explicitly, it can be easily derived from 
model assumptions and equation (11). 
1.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter argues that investment, depreciation and productive capital can all play 
an important role as key determinants of the optimal international reserves relative to 
output in SOEs when production is modelled explicitly. When extended to an AK 
technology, the JR endowment SOE benchmark implies a richer formula for optimal 
reserves-to-GDP16. Our extended model shows analytically and quantitatively, given 
calibration using the JR sample of 34 countries updated to 2014, that a higher capital 
productivity and a higher investment rate decrease the ratio of optimal reserves-to-
GDP, while a higher depreciation rate increases it. 
                                                
16 An analytical comparison of optimal reserves-to-output formula in the JR endowment SOE 
benchmark and in our extension to AK production model can be seen in Figure 1.7. 
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In the AK production model, we found the optimal ratio of international 
reserves to output to be much lower, 1.74%, than the corresponding one derived in the 
endowment SOE benchmark of Jeanne and Rancière (2011), 9.1%. We would outline 
our intuition regarding this main result in the following way. When the capital stock is 
accumulated through investment and potentially used as a pledge to external creditors 
in obtaining borrowing and therefore insuring better against sudden stops, the optimal 
reserve-to-output ratio can optimally be much lower in the AK model relative to an 
otherwise similar endowment economy. On the other hand, depreciation depletes the 
existing capital stock, an opposite effect to that of net investment; hence, the optimal 
reverses ratio also depends positively on depreciation of capital in the AK model. 
Furthermore, government policy in the AK model can generate endogenously 
persistent capital accummulation leading to sustained long-run growth throug tax and 
subsidy instruments. 
While our extension in chapter 1 implies increasing returns to scale (IRS) and 
is justified on the grounds of the ability of the AK model to generate endogenously 
capital accummulation and sustained long-run growth observed in the data 
(Acemoglu, 2009, p. 55; Jones and Vollrath, 2013, p. 216), it abstracts from labour as 
a second input into the production function. Therefore, in chapter 2 we proceed to add 
labour and switch to a labour-augmenting Cobb-Douglass (CD) production function, 
justified on the grounds of being consistent with a long-run balanced growth path 
(BGP) in neoclassical models of exogenous growth (Acemoglu, 2009, p. 59) and with 
sustained per capita income growth in these models (Jones and Vollrath, 2013, pp. 36-
37). We shall see how such an alternative and plausible technology specification 
would modify the optimal reserves-to-output formula. 
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Appendix to Chapter 1 
 
1.A.1 Figures 
 
Figure 1.1: Global International Reserves (in trillions US Dollars)	
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (online). Data on internatioanl reserves less gold 
for the 34 middle income countries (listed in Table 1.2 in Appendix 1.A) and the world. 
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Figure 1.2: Average Dynamics of Key Model Variables in Sudden Stops 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from IMF’s International Financial Statistics, and World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
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Figure 1.3: Optimal Reserves-to-GDP Ratio as a Function of Its Key Determinants in 
the AK model 
 
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from IMF’s International Financial Statistics, Penn World 
Table 7.0 and World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
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Figure 1.4: International Reserves as % of Total External Debt by World Regions 
 
 
 
Note: Figures 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 (that follow) show commonly accepted reserve adequacy indicators for 
the 34 middle income countries in our/JR sample. All data is from IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics and World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Countries are grouped according to their 
continent. 
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Figure 1.5: Broad Money as % of International Reserves by World Regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: See the note to Figure 1.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Year
Broad Money to Reserve Ratio
 
 
Average
Latin America
Asia
Europe
Africa
	 55	
Figure 1.6: International Reserves to GDP by World Regions 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: See the note to Figure 1.5. 
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Figure 1.7: Optimal Reserves-to-Output Formula in the JR Endowment SOE 
Benchmark and in Our Extension to AK Production: Analytical Comparison 
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1.A.2 Tables 
Table 1.1: Countries and Years of Sudden Stops 
Country Dates of Sudden Stops 
Argentina 1989, 1994, 2001, 2002, 2008 
Bolivia 1980, 1982, 1983, 1985, 2000, 2003, 2006 
Botswana 1977, 1987, 1993, 2001 
Brazil 2008 
Bulgaria 1989, 1990, 1994, 1996, 2008 
Chile 1982, 1983, 1998, 2007 
China  
Colombia  
Costa Rica 1981 
Czech Republic 1996, 2003 
Dominican Rep. 2002 
Ecuador 1983, 1999, 2000, 2006 
Egypt 1987, 1990, 1999, 2006 
El Salvador 2004, 2007 
Guatemala  
Honduras  
Hungary 1994, 1996 
Jamaica 1985, 1986, 2002, 2003 
Jordan 1976, 1979, 1980, 1984, 1989, 1992, 1993, 1998, 2001, 2003 
Korea 1997, 2008 
Malaysia 1987, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2005, 2008 
Mexico 1982, 1995 
Morocco 1978, 1995 
Paraguay 1985, 1988 
Peru 1983, 1998 
Philippines 1983, 1997, 1998, 2008 
Poland 1994 
Romania 2008 
South Africa  
Sri Lanka  
Thailand 1998, 2007 
Tunisia  
Turkey 1994, 2001 
Uruguay 1983, 2002, 2004 
Note: A sudden stop is defined if the ratio of capital inflows to gross domestic product (GDP) 
decreases by more than 5% relative to the preceding year. Source: IMF, International Financial 
Statistics and World Bank, World Development Indicators (online). 
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Table 1.2: Calibration of Key Parameters in the AK Model 
 
Parameters AK Model Range of Variation 
 
Technology 
 *+ = 0.40  
Size of a Sudden Stop < = 0.10 [0, 0.30] 
Probability of a Sudden Stop 7 = 0.10 [0, 0.24] 
Output Loss 6 = 0.065 [0,0.2] 
Price of a Non-Crisis Dollar ; = 0.855  
Depreciation Rate of Capital 0 = 0.06 [0, 1] 
Risk Free Rate ( = 0.05  
Coefficient of Risk Aversion ) = 2 [1, 10] 
Capital-Labour Ratio > = 37701  
GDP per Worker = = 15141  
Investment Rate 0.24 [0, 0.48] 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from IMF’s International Financial Statistics, Penn World 
Table 7.0 and World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
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1.B Model Derivation  
 
Foreign Insurers’ Contract  
The foreign insurers’ contract is given by 
 
u"@P"LQ 1 − 7 "KQ 1 − 7 8":"[ − 7 9" − 8" :"j ≥ 0, 
and if it is binding, as assumed, it holds with equality so that one can write 
 
 1 − 7 8":"[ = 7 9" − 8" :"j 
 
; = :"[:"j = 7(9" − 8")(1 − 7)8"  
 
; = 7(9" − 8")(1 − 7)8"  
 ;(1 − 7)7 = (9" − 8")8"  
 ;(1 − 7)7 = 9"8" − 1 
 9"8" = ;(1 − 7)7 + 1 
 8" = 77 + ;(1 − 7)9". 
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First Order Condition from Maximizing the Lagrangian Function 
 
Budget Constraint in Normal Times and Sudden Stop Episodes 
 
AK Technology (assuming constant population irrelevant to technology) 
 
With the AK technology, output is given by 
 $" = Z /"; * = */". 
 
The ‘normal time’ budget constraint (superscript n) of the private sector is given by 
 #"[ = $"[ ∙ − %"[ + &"[ − 1 + ( &"KQ[ + '"[ 
 
and investment by 
 		?y #"[ = ;?y #"j 	 
 
 
 ; = ?′(#"[)?′(#"j). 
With the assumed isoelastic, or CRRA, period utility, 
 
 ? # = #QKR1 − ), 
we further obtain 
; = àâõ Å}àâú Å} or ; = àâõàâú KR and finally ;QR #"[ = #"j 
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 %"[ = .$"[ ∙ , 
 
with capital accumulation written as 
 /"@Q[ :		/"@Q = %"[ + 1 − 0 /". 
 
Using the AK technology to replace $"[ ∙ = Z /"; * = */" in the assumption for 
normal-time investment above, we obtain 
 /"@Q = .*/" + 1 − 0 /". 
 
Then, the gross growth rate of the capital stock is, as standard in neoclassical growth 
theory, 
 
1 + 1+ = /"@Q/" = 1 + .* − 0. 
 
And, therefore, this is also the gross growth rate of the output in the AK model. 
 
Note that the short-term external debt (STED) ratio to output remains constant as in 
JR but is now given by 
 
< ≡ 1 + .* − 01 + ( 	4. 
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Replacing investment, we can write the normal-time budget constraint of the private 
sector as 
 #"[ = $"[ ∙ − .$"[ ∙ + &"[ − 1 + ( &"KQ[ + '"[. 
 
With AK technology, output is given as $"[ = Z /"; * = */", and using &"[ =Q@ jÉKÇQ@ù 4$"[ ∙ = <$"[ ∙  and '"[ = −8", we further obtain (successively): 
 
#"[ = */" − .*/" + 1 + .* − 01 + ( 4*/" − (1 + .* − 0)4*/"KQ − 8" 
 #"[ = */" − .*/" + <*/" − 4*/" − 8" 
 
#"[ = */" − .*/" + <*/" − < 1 + (1 + .* − 0 */" − 8" 
 
#"[ = 1 − . + < 1 − 1 + (1 + .* − 0 */" − 8" 
 
#"[ = 1 − . + < .* − 0 − (1 + .* − 0 */" − 8" 
 
#"[ = 1 − . − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 */" − 8". 
 
The ‘sudden stop’ budget constraint (superscript s) of the private sector is given by 
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#"j = 1 − 6 $"[ ∙ − 	%"j − 1 + ( &"KQj + 	'"j, 
 
and we assume that the capital stock does not grow in sudden stops,	1+ = 0, so that 
 /"@Qj :		/"@Q = /", 
 
which implies, in the AK model, 
 
1 + 1+ = /"@Q/" = 1 + .* − 0 = 0 
 
so that .* = 0 
and 
 %"j = 0/". 
 
Note that in the AK model capital grows only if .* > 0. 
 
Replacing sudden-stop investment, we can also write the above budget constraint as 
 #"j = 1 − 6 $"[ ∙ − 0/" + &"j − 1 + ( &"KQj + '"j. 
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With AK technology, output is given by $" = Z /"; * = */", and using &"j = 0, 	&"KQj = Q@ jÉKÇQ@ù 4$"KQ[ ∙ = <$"KQ[ ∙  and '"j = 9" − 8", we further obtain 
(successively): 
 #"j = 1 − 6 */" − 0/" − 1 + .* − 0 4*/"KQ + 9" − 8" 
 #"j = 1 − 6 */" − 0/" − 4*/"+9" − 8" 
 
#"j = 1 − 6 */" − 0/" − 1 + (1 + .* − 0 <	*/"+9" − 8" 
 
#"j = −6 − 0* + 1 − 1 + (1 + .* − 0 < */" + 9" − 8" 
 
#"j = −6 − 0* + 1 + .* − 0 − 1 − (1 + .* − 0 < */" + 9" − 8" 
 
#"j = −6 − 0* + .* − 0 − (1 + .* − 0 < */" + 9" − 8" 
 
#"j = −6 − 0* − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 */" + 9" − 8". 
 
Therefore, from the first order condition, the optimal level of reserves as a ratio to 
output can be expressed as: 
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;QR 1 − . − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 */" − 8"
= −6 − 0* − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 */" + 9" − 8" 
 
;QR 1 − . − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 */" − ;QR8"
= −6 − 0* − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 */" + 9" − 8" 
 
;QR 1 − . − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 */" − −6 − 0* − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 */"
= 9" − 8" + ;QR8" 
 
;QR 1 − . − ;QR< ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 + 6 + 0* + < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 */" = 9" − 1 − ;QR 8" 
 
;QR 1 − . + 1 − ;QR < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 + 6 + 0* */"
= 9" − 1 − ;QR 77 + ;(1 − 7)9" 
 
;QR 1 − . + 1 − ;QR < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 + 6 + 0* */"
= 1 − 1 − ;QR 77 + ;(1 − 7) 9" 
 
And, finally, we obtain the optimal reserves-to-output ratio, w∗, under the AK 
technology case in the production SOE we analysed: 
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w∗ = 9"*/" = 6 + 0* + ;
QR 1 − . + < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 1 − ;QR1 − 77 + ;(1 − 7) 1 − ;QR , 
 
An alternative equivalent expression where the parameter < appears also 
additively as in the original JR optimal reserves expression can be obtained, as 
follows. 
 
Since #"j = 1 − 6 */" − 0/" − Q@ùQ@jÉKÇ <	*/"+9" − 8" 
 
we could write 
 
#"j = (1 − 6) − 0* − 1 + (1 + .* − 0 < */" + 9" − 8" 
 
#"j = (1 − 6) − 0* − 1 + ( + 1 + .* − 0 − 1 − (.* − 0)1 + (.* − 0) < */" + 9" − 8" 
 
#"j = 1 − 6 − 0* − 1 + .* − 01 + .* − 0 < − 1 + ( − 1 − (.* − 0)1 + (.* − 0) < */" + 9" − 8" 
 
#"j = 1 − 6 − 0* − < − ( − (.* − 0)1 + (.* − 0) < */" + 9" − 8". 
 
Then, optimal reserves-to-output can be obtained: 
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;|} 1 − . − < ùK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ */" − 8" = 1 − 6 − ÇÉ − < − ùK(jÉKÇ)Q@(jÉKÇ) < */" + 9" − 8"  
 ;|} 1 − . − < ùK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ */" − ;|}8" = 1 − 6 − ÇÉ − < − ùK(jÉKÇ)Q@(jÉKÇ) < */" + 9" − 8"  
 ;|} 1 − . − < ùK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ */" − 1 − 6 − ÇÉ − < − ùK(jÉKÇ)Q@(jÉKÇ) < */" = 9" − 8" + ;|}8"  
 ;|} 1 − . − ;|}< ùK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ − 1 − 6 + < + ÇÉ + < ùK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ */" = 9" − 1 − ;|} 8"  
 ;|} − ;|}. + 1 − ;|} < ùK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ − 1 + 6 + < + ÇÉ */" = 9" − 1 − ;|} ÑÑ@{(QKÑ) 9"  
 − 1 − ;|} − ;|}. + 1 − ;|} < ùK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ + 6 + < + ÇÉ */" = 9" − 1 −;|} ÑÑ@{(QKÑ) 9"  
 6 + < + ÇÉ − ;|}. − 1 − ;|} 1 − < ùK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ */" = 1 − 1 − ;|} ÑÑ@{(QKÑ) 9"  
 
w∗ = 9"*/" = 6 + < − 1 − ;
QR 1 − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 + 0* − ;QR.1 − 77 + ;(1 − 7) 1 − ;QR . 
 .* > 0 is the condition for the AK economy to increase its capital stock, and hence to 
grow, over time. Note that .* − 0 > 0 and ( − .* − 0 > 0 by assumption – and, 
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then 0 < < ùK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ < 1 so that 1 − < ùK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ > 0 and w∗ > 0 as long as 6 + < +
ÇÉ > 1 − ;|} 1 − < ùK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ + ;|}.] 
 
We can manipulate our equation (31) in order to get equation (32) as follows: 
w∗ = 6 + < − 1 − ;QR 1 − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 + 0* − ;QR.1 − 77 + ;(1 − 7) 1 − ;QR  
 
w∗ 1 − ÑÑ@{ QKÑ 1 − ;|} = 6 + < − 1 − ;|} 1 − < QK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ + ÇÉ − ;|}.  
 w∗ − w∗ ÑÑ@{ QKÑ 1 − ;|} = 6 + < − 1 − ;|} 1 − < ùK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ + ÇÉ − ;|}.  
 6 + < − w∗ = 1 − ;|} 1 − < ùK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ + ÇÉ − ;|}. − w∗ ÑÑ@{ QKÑ 1 − ;|}   
 6 + < − w∗
= 1 − ;QR 1 − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 + 0* − ;QR.
− (6 + < − 1 − ;QR 1 − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 + 0* − ;QR.1 − 77 + ;(1 − 7) 1 − ;QR ) 77 + ; 1 − 7 1 − ;QR  
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6 + < − w∗
= 1 − ;QR 1 − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 + 0* − ;QR.1 − 77 + ;(1 − 7) 1 − ;QR 1 − 77 + ;(1 − 7) 1 − ;QR
− 6 + < − 1 − ;QR 1 − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 + 0* − ;QR.1 − 77 + ;(1 − 7) 1 − ;QR 77 + ; 1 − 7 1 − ;QR  
 6 + < − w∗ =
QK{|} QKûüÅ ú†Å°| ú†Å° @°†K{|}j QK ~~Ä(|Å~) QK{|} K ¢@ûK QK{|} QKûüÅ ú†Å°| ú†Å° @°†K{|}j ~~Ä |Å~ QK{|} 	QK ~~Ä(|Å~) QK{|}   
 6 + < − w∗ =
QK{|} QKûüÅ ú†Å°| ú†Å° @°†K{|}j QK ~~Ä(|Å~) QK{|} K ¢@ûK QK{|} QKûüÅ ú†Å°| ú†Å° @°†K{|}j ~~Ä |Å~ QK{|} 	QK ~~Ä(|Å~) QK{|}   
 
 =
QK{|} K QK{|} ûüÅ ú†Å°| ú†Å° @°†K{|}j QK ~~Ä(|Å~) QK{|} K (¢@û) ~~Ä |Å~ QK{|} K QK{|} QKûüÅ ú†Å°| ú†Å° @°†K{|}j ~~Ä |Å~ QK{|} 	
QK ~~Ä(|Å~) QK{|}   
 =
QK{|} QK ~~Ä(|Å~) QK{|} K QK{|} ûüÅ ú†Å°| ú†Å° @°†K{|}j QK ~~Ä(|Å~) QK{|} K (¢@û) ~~Ä |Å~ QK{|} K QK{|} QKûüÅ ú†Å°| ú†Å° @°†K{|}j ~~Ä |Å~ QK{|} 	QK ~~Ä(|Å~) QK{|}   
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= 1 − ;QR1 − 77 + ;(1 − 7) 1 − ;QR 1 − 77 + ; 1 − 7 1 − ;QR − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 − 0*
+ ;QR. 1 − 77 + ; 1 − 7 1 − ;QR − 6 + < 77 + ; 1 − 7
+ 1 − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 + 0* − ;QR. 77 + ; 1 − 7 1 − ;QR  
 
 1 − ππ + p 1 − π 1 − pQ• − λ r − sA − δ1 + sA − δ − δA
+ pQ•s 1 − ππ + p 1 − π 1 − pQ• − γ + λ ππ + p 1 − π
+ ππ + p 1 − π 1 − pQ• −λ r − sA − δ1 + sA − δ + δA
− pQ•s ππ + p 1 − π 1 − pQ•  
 
 
 1 − < ùK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ − ÇÉ + ;|}. + < ùK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ − ÇÉ + ;|}. ÑÑ@{ QKÑ 1 − ;|} −
6 + < ÑÑ@{ QKÑ + −< ùK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ + ÇÉ − ;|}. ÑÑ@{ QKÑ 1 − ;|}   
 
6 + < − w∗ = QK{|}QK ~~Ä(|Å~) QK{|} 1 − < ùK jÉKÇQ@ jÉKÇ − ÇÉ + ;|}. − 6 + < ÑÑ@{ QKÑ   
 1 − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 − 0* + ;QR. − 6 + < 77 + ; 1 − 7 + 6 + < − 6 + <  
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1 − < 1 − ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 − 0* + ;QR. + 6 + < 1 − 77 + ; 1 − 7 − 6  
 
1 − < 1 − .* − 0 + ( + .* − 01 + .* − 0 − 0* + ;QR. + 6 + < 7 + ; 1 − 7 − 77 + ; 1 − 7
− 6  
 
1 − < 1 + (1 + .* − 0 − 0* + ;QR. + 6 + < ; 1 − 77 + ; 1 − 7 − 6  
 
6 + < − w∗ = 1 − ;QR1 − 77 + ;(1 − 7) 1 − ;QR 1 − 4 − 6 − 0* + ;QR.
+ 6 + < ; 1 − 77 + ; 1 − 7  
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Chapter 2: The Optimal Level of International Reserves in a 
Production Small Open Economy: Cobb-Douglas Model 
 
Abstract 
This chapter revisits the role of investment and production on the optimal level of 
international reserves in terms of output for small open economies (SOEs), now using 
a more general production function in order to incorporate labour input and 
population growth in the model of the preceding chapter. In particular, consistent with 
neoclassical growth theory, we employ a labour-augmenting constant returns to scale 
(CRS) Cobb-Douglas (CD) production function. We find, as in chapter 1, that the 
optimal reserve-to-GDP formula decreases with the investment rate and the growth 
rate of capital and increases with the depreciation rate but now, along the balanced 
growth path (BGP) in chapter 2, it also increases with population growth and the 
capital-labour ratio and decreases with labour productivity and the capital share in 
output. Depending on the calibration of the labour-augmenting productivity 
parameter, the CRS CD model quantifies the optimal ratio of reserves to output at 
5.5% in the richer two-factor production SOE model, i.e., roughly three times higher 
than the AK model of chapter 1 but at the same time 60% lower than the endowment 
SOE model of Jeanne and Rancière (2011). As we suggested in chapter 1 already, 
with the capital stock now accumulated via investment and potentially used as a 
pledge to external creditors in obtaining borrowing and therefore insuring better 
against sudden stops, the optimal reserve-to-output ratio is lower relative to an 
otherwise similar endowment economy in the endogenous growth AK model. 
Differently from chapter 1, however, adding labour and constant population growth, 
consistent with a long-run BGP in neoclassical models of exogenous growth and with 
sustained per capita income growth, results in a lower per capita pledge and, hence, a 
higher optimal reserve-to-output ratio in the CD model relative to the AK model. 
 
Keywords: International Reserves, Sudden Stops, Labour-Augmenting Productivity, 
Investment, Cobb-Douglas Technology 
JEL Classification: F31, F32, F33, F41  
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The role of investment in determining the optimal level of reserves for a small open 
production economy has been discussed in the preceding chapter in an AK model 
version. In it, capital was the only factor of production and, by assumption, 
technology enhanced the productivity capital. However, we have not considered yet 
the role of labour as a second production input, labour-augmenting technology and 
population growth in determining optimal reserves-to-GDP in SOEs. Therefore, the 
aim of this chapter is to extend the preceding one by investigating the importance of 
these additional key macro-variables typical in neoclassical growth theory relative to 
that of the established determinants of optimal reserves in the AK production model 
and the JR endowment benchmark. 
We derive a reserve-to-GDP ratio in a two-factor production model where 
labour is also included, and we refer to this version as the two-factor production SOE 
Cobb-Douglas (CD) model with labour-augmenting technological progress and 
exogenous population growth, or simply the CD model (of exogenous growth); in 
turn, this version implies constant returns to scale (CRS) and is justified on the 
grounds of being consistent with a long-run balanced growth path (BGP) in 
exogenous growth models (Acemoglu, 2009, p. 59) and with sustained per capita 
income growth in these models (Jones and Vollrath, 2013, pp. 36-37). 
More precisely, in chapter 2 we switch to a labour-augmenting CD production 
function relative to the AK production function in chapter 1 in order to compare our 
results across this alternative technology specification typical in neoclassical growth 
theory. The CD model in the present chapter embodies as well an alternative 
assumption of CRS, but with diminishing returns to scale (DRS) for each of the two 
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factors, capital and labour, convergence to a balanced growth path (BGP) in the long 
run, with ‘catching up’ of countries where capital-to-output is initially relatively low. 
This version of the model thus focuses on the effects of labour-augmenting 
productivity and population growth on the optimal reserves-to-output ratio in a 
production SOE. 
We find, as in chapter 1, that the optimal reserve-to-GDP formula decreases 
with the investment rate and the growth rate of capital and increases with the 
depreciation rate. In addition, along the BGP in chapter 2, it also increases with 
population growth and the capital-labour ratio and decreases with labour productivity 
and the capital share in output. Depending on the calibration of the labour-augmenting 
productivity parameter, the CRS CD model quantifies the optimal ratio of reserves to 
output at 5.5% in the richer two-factor production SOE model, i.e., roughly three 
times higher than the AK model of chapter 1 but at the same time 60% lower than the 
JR endowment SOE model. As we argued in chapter 1, with the capital stock now 
accumulated via investment and potentially used as a pledge to external creditors in 
obtaining borrowing and therefore insuring better against sudden stops, the optimal 
reserve-to-output ratio is lower relative to an otherwise similar endowment economy 
in the endogenous growth AK model. Differently from chapter 1, however, adding 
labour and constant population growth, consistent with a long-run BGP in 
neoclassical models of exogenous growth and with sustained per capita income 
growth, results in a lower per capita pledge and, hence, a higher optimal reserve-to-
output ratio in the CD model relative to the AK model. 
To be able to make a consistent comparison between the three theoretical 
results deriving the optimal ratio of international reserves to output, the JR 
endowment SOE model, our AK IRS endogenous growth SOE model in chapter 1 and 
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our CD CRS exogenous growth SOE model of chapter 2), we follow most of the 
assumptions in the JR benchmark and in our AK technology extension. Consequently, 
we use same dataset as in the first chapter. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents our 
extension to the JR endowment economy and the AK IRS model for a production 
economy to a CD CRS SOE model version. The results of the calibration are provided 
in section 2.3. Section 2.4 concludes. 
2.2 Optimal Level of Reserves with Deterministic CRS 
Labour-Augmenting Technology: Balanced Growth Path 
 
In the previous chapter, labour was normalised and productive capital was the only 
variable of interest, featuring the AK model as one of the prominent endogenous 
growth models in neoclassical theory. In this subsection, we also introduce labour and 
examine the effect of a more general production function on optimal reserve holdings 
under exogenous population growth, in the tradition of neoclassical growth theory. 
More precisely, we now employ a CRS labour-augmenting CD production function. 
We employ this particular production function rather than the common alternatives 
such as Hicks-neutral technology and Solow-neutral technology, because the Harrod-
neutral technology we choose is the only one that is consistent with a solution for the 
BGP in the long run (Acemoglu, 2009, p. 59) and with sustained per capita income 
growth in these models (Jones and Vollrath, 2013, pp. 36-37). It also allows us to 
check robustness of the results we obtained for the production SOE under AK 
technology implying IRS and perpetual endogenous growth with those under an 
alternative CD technology implying CRS and exogenous BGP. 
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All assumptions of the AK model hold through, except that the production 
function hereafter takes a different form. The latter requires a few additional 
assumptions, which are first discussed. Then, a corresponding formula for the optimal 
level of international reserves in terms of GDP is derived within the CD model 
version of our production SOE. 
 
2.2.1 Assumptions under Labour-Augmenting CD Technology  
 
This model version differs from the one with AK technology in that it introduces 
labour, as a second factor of production. Assuming that all firms in this economy have 
an identical production function for the final goods, the aggregate production function 
is then17 
 $" is the total amount of output of the final good at time o, /" is the capital stock, ©" is 
total employment and * is now a parameter interpreted in the neoclassical tradition as 
labour-augmenting technology. As is conventional with CD production, 0 < s < 1 
measures the contribution of the capital stock to output and is proxied by the capital 
share in national income; 1 − s then measures the contribution of labour services to 
output and is proxied by the labour share in national income; furthermore, CD 
typically assumed CRS, as implied by the domain of s. Following neoclassical 
growth theory and, more recently in similar model contexts Jeanne and Rancière 
(2011) and Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013), we also assume: (i) a unitary labour force 
                                                
17 The same labour-augmenting CD production function is employed by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) 
in a similar set-up establishing what they term ‘the allocation puzzle’ in capital flows to developing 
countries. 
 $" = Z /", *©" = /"™(*©)"QK™. (1) 
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participation rate, i.e., ©" denotes both the size of the population in period t as well as 
the size of workers; (ii) perfect competition in factor markets implying that each 
factor of production is paid its marginal product. 
The well-known standard features of this production function are assumed: 
continuity, twice-differentiability with respect to each argument, positive diminishing 
returns to each factor and constant returns to scale to both factors – see, e.g., 
Acemoglu (2009), p. 29, Assumption 1. 
Introducing labour, ©", into the production SOE model requires a description 
of population growth, assumed to be exogenously given, as in the neoclassical growth 
theory and, more recently, in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013), 
 
 
where ©´ is the population level in a base period and 13 is the constant population net 
growth rate. 
There is no change in the definition of the budget constraint relative to chapter 
1, but domestic output is now replaced by equation (1). As in neoclassical growth 
theory, we can express the production function in % terms, that is, in growth rates, by 
taking natural logarithms from both sides in period t and t-1, and then subtracting to 
form the respective first log-differences: 
which decomposes the growth rate of output, 1ä, as a weighted average of the growth 
rates of the population, 13, and the capital stock, 1+, with the weights defined by the 
 ∆©"@Q©" = 13	; 	©" = (1 + 13)"©´, (2) 
 ¨X$" = 1 − s ¨X* + ¨X©" + s¨X/" − s¨X©" 1ä = 1 − s 13 + s1+ 
  
(3) 
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respective contributions of the two productive factors used as inputs, s for capital and 1 − s for labour, to final output. 
As in neoclassical growth theory, along a balanced growth path (BGP) for the 
population and the capital stock, defined as standard by 13 = 1+ so that 1ä = 13 =1+ too, and thus >" = +â3â = > = ≠ÆX.o, hence, >" = > is a steady state (SS) for >" or, 
equivalently, 12 = 0. Assuming again that the saving-to-output ratio is constant, s, we 
can now define the rate of growth of capital per capita,  
 
and which – according to neoclassical growth theory (see, e.g., Jones and Vollrath, 
2013, p. 28) – implies capital widening: namely, capital per worker does not change, 12 = 0, but the capital stock grows at the same rate as the population, 
 
1+ = . =">" − 0 = . $"/" − 0 = 13. 
 
If – by contrast – we allow for growth in the capital-labour ratio, 12 = ∆2â|2â >0, denoted in the literature as capital deepening, then 
 
12 = ∆>"@Q>" = ∆/"@Q/" − ∆©"@Q©" = . =">" − 0 − 13 > 0 
Note that 
12 = ∆>"@Q>" = ∆/"@Q/" − ∆©"@Q©" = 1+ − 13, 
 12 = ∆>"@Q>" = ∆/"@Q/" − ∆©"@Q©" = . =">" − 0 − 13 = . $"/" − 0 − 13 = 0 
 
 
(4) 
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so that 
1+ = 12 + 13 = . $"/" − 0 − 13 + 13 = . $"/" − 0 > 13. 
 
In the normal state, we assume that 1+ is (marginally) higher than 13 so that 12 grows but (very) slowly (and therefore the capital-labour ratio does not explode in 
a longer-run perspective – due to the deterministic nature of the model in this simplest 
version). That is: 
12 = ∆>"@Q>" > 0; 
then, we can rewrite equation (3), 
 
As assumed, domestic private sector saving occurs through investment in 
physical capital and is a constant fraction of output in the normal state: 
Then, as in neoclassical growth theory (see Appendix 2.B), we can re-write equation 
(4) as, 
 
Equation (7) implies that the capital-output ratio is constant along the BGP 
and it equals the domestic investment rate, ., over the sum of the growth rate of per 
capita capital,	12, the depreciation rate, 0, and the growth rate of labour, 13. From 
equation (7), investment in normal times is, 
 1ä = Ø¨X$" = 1 − s 13 + s . $"/" − 0      (5) 
 . = -"$" = %"$" (6) 
 /"$" = .1+ + 0 + 13 = ≠ÆX.o	(∞¨ÆX1	±≤≥) 
 
 
(7) 
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If we replace output by the production function in order to see the effect of its 
components on the optimal level of reserves in normal times, we obtain 
where output is proportional to the capital stock. 
As conventional in such model contexts, the economy follows a BGP, where 
all key variables grow at the same rate	1, 
 
Now the budget constraint of the consumers in normal times can be written as, 
where &"[ and '"[ denote external debt and government net transfers, respectively, as 
in chapter 1. 
We assume that the capital-labour ratio (or per capita capital) does not grow in 
sudden stops, equivalent to writing: 
 >"@Qj = >"j 
 12 = ∆2â|2â = 0 results in . íâ2â − 0 − 13 = 0, 
 
so that investment in the CD model is given by, 
 %"[ = .$" = (1+ + 0 + 13)/" (8) 
 /"™(*©")QK™ = 1+ + 0 + 13. /" 
 
 
(9) 
 1 = 1+ = 13 = 1É (10) 
 #"[ = $"[ ∙ − .$"[ ∙ + &"[ − 1 + ( &"KQ[ + '"[. 
 
(11) 
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As in chapter 1, replacing investment, we can write the sudden-stop budget constraint 
of the private sector as, 
Following Jeanne and Rancière (2011), in this subsection, the economy can be 
again in two states, normal times and crisis state, as in the previous chapter. So, the 
assumptions for output remain valid, Z(/")	[ 	= 1 + 1 "Z(/"KQ) and Z(/")	j =1 − 6 Z(/")	[. The economy still follows the restriction for borrowing since there is 
no change on the pledgeable output, 1 + ( &" ≤ 4"Z(/"@Q)	[. The role of the 
monetary authority and the participation condition for external creditors are same as 
in the JR endowment SOE benchmark, i.e., 		'"[ = −8"; and '"j = 9" − 8"; and u"@P"LQ 1 − 7 "KQ 1 − 7 8":"[ − 7 9" − 8" :"j ≥ 0. 
 
2.2.2 A Formula for the Optimal Level of Reserves under the CD Model 
 
 
As in the JR model, we continue to assume that 1 + ( &" ≤ 4"Z(/"@Q)	[ is always 
binding, which allows for a closed-form solution of this simple insurance problem of 
the SOE, now with labour-augmenting CD production and exogenous population 
growth. However, the parameter <, denoting as before the short term external debt 
(STED) to output ratio, now takes a slightly different form, namely 
 %"j = .$" = 0 + 13 /", 
 
(12) 
 #"j = 1 − 6 $"[ ∙ − (0 + 13)/" + &"j − 1 + ( &"KQj + '"j. 
 
(13) 
 < = &"[/"™(*©")QK™ ≡ 1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + ( 	4 
 
 
(14) 
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since the country keeps a constant STED-to-output ratio when the external credit 
constraint is always binding. < denotes the same parameter as in the AK production 
SOE model version of chapter 1, but here in chapter 2 the definition of output in the 
denominator of (14) has changed, and therefore the expression for < too. 
Using the CD production function, consumption in the non-crisis state can be 
written as 
By analogy, consumption in the sudden stop episode can be written as, 
Then, as in JR and chapter 1, we set a similar Lagrangian optimisation 
problem18; since there is no change in the role of the monetary authority, it enters a 
reserve insurance contract as described above in order to maximize the private 
sector’s utility subject to the constraints (8), (11), (12), (13), the external borrowing 
constraint and the external creditors’ participation condition. 
The optimal reserves-to-output ratio, w∗, is then constant, as in chapter 1, but 
is now given by a different expression 
 
As formula (17) demonstrates, the optimal level of reserves in terms of GDP 
with deterministic CD CRS production function has many common determinants with 
                                                
18 Hence; this results in a similar first order condition, 	?y #"[ = ;?y #"j , which implies that domestic 
consumption can be substituted at the same rate between normal times and sudden stop episodes by the 
private sector and external creditors as in the first chapter. Similarly, this model also yields the same 
expression for government net transfers, 8" = ÑÑ@{(QKÑ) 9". 
 #"[ = 1 − . − < ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ /"™(*©")QK™ − 8"  (15) 
 														#"j = −6 − (Ç@¥µ)+â+â∂(É3â)|Å∂ − < ùK QK™ ¥µ@™¥∑Q@ QK™ ¥µ@™¥∑ /"™(*©")QK™ + 9" − 8"  
 
(16) 
 		w∗ = ëâ+â∂(É3â)|Å∂ = ¢@ûK QKûüÅ[ |Å∂ ∏µ∂∏∑]|[ |Å∂ ∏µ∂∏∑] QK{|} @(Ç@¥µ) π† |Å∂K{|}jQK ~~Ä(|Å~) QK{|}    (17) 
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the AK model in chapter 1, such as: 6 is the output loss in the first period of capital 
outflows, < is the STED-to-output ratio, ; is the price ratio of funds in different states 
(normal times and sudden stop episodes), ( is the world interest rate, . is the constant 
investment rate of the domestic SOE, 0 is the depreciation rate of physical capital,	7 
is the crisis probability, and ) is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA). 
However, differently from the analogous optimal reserves-to-GDP formula in chapter 
1, several additional determinants enter into consideration, such as: the (net) growth 
rate of labour, 13; the (net) growth rate of the capital stock, 1+; the capital-labour 
ratio, >; the capital share in income, s; and the technology level of the CD economy19 
where * is now labour-augmenting technology. 
 
Theorem: Given that the capital share of income is between zero and one,0 < s < 1, 
the partial derivative of reserve-to-output ratio with respect to the capital share of 
income of less than zero. ∫w∗∫s < 0 
Proof: Take the first derivative of equation (17) with respect to capital share of 
income, s which gives, 
ªº∗ª™ = K QK{|} û(∏∑Å∏µ)(üÅ |Å∂ ∏µÅ∂∏∑)| |Å∂ ∏µ∂∏∑ Ω @ û (∏∑Å∏µ)| |Å∂ ∏µ∂∏∑ K π† |Å∂(Ç@¥µ) æi π†QK ~~Ä(|Å~) QK{|}   
 Given that the sign of numerator is negative, then the sign of partial derivative is 
negative. 
                                                
19 We use *3	for the CD CRS exogenous growth model version in the present chapter and *+ for the 
AK IRS endogenous growth model in the preceding chapter when we compare the two theoretically 
derived expressions for the optimal reserves-to-output ratio. 
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Equation (17) implies some determinants of optimal reserves in terms of GDP 
that are the same as those in the AK production model version20 discussed in chapter 
1. For example, the optimal reserve ratio is a positive function of: (i) the output cost 
of a sudden stop, 6; (ii) the level of short term debt, <; (iii) the probability of a sudden 
stop,	7; (iv) the depreciation rate, 0; (v) the world interest rate, (; and (vi) risk 
aversion,	); whereas it is a negative function of the investment rate of the economy, .. 
Differently from the AK model, the additional determinants in this CD 
production version influence the optimal reserves-to-output ratio as follows: (i) 
population growth, 13, positively, as expected21; (ii) the capital share in income,	s, 
negatively; (iii) the capital-labour ratio, >, positively; (iv) labour-augmenting 
productivity, *3, negatively; (v) the growth rate of capital, 12, negatively. 
The differences in the AK IRS model of endogenous growth versus the CD 
CRS model of exogenous growth arise from the modelling of investment and 
production functions. A first difference is the growth rate of the economy. Unlike the 
JR endowment SOE model, in both the previous chapter 1 and present chapter 2 we 
analyse components of the growth rate of the economy rather than a simple parameter 1. However, our two production SOE versions implied a different relation between 
the growth rate of the economy and the component growth rates: (i) .* − 0 in the AK 
model and (ii) 1 − s 13 + s1+ in the CD model. Consequently, we need the growth 
rate of labour, 13, and physical capital, 1+, in the CD model of chapter 2. Secondly, 
the CD model assumes production in a richer context than the AK model since it 
includes labour input and population growth. Therefore, we have the additional 
determinants of optimal reserves-to-output: the capital-labour ratio, > and the capital 
                                                
20 And also with the original JR endowment SOE model. 
21 The earlier literature on the optimal level of reserves assumes that population is a scale variable and 
shows a positive relationship with the level of reserves – see, e.g., Heller (1966), Clark (1970), Kelly 
(1970), Hamada and Ueda (1977), Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981).	
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share in income,	s. A final difference relates to the definition of productivity, *. In 
each model version, AK and CD, productivity (no matter whether it is capital 
productivity, *+, or labour-augmenting productivity, *3) decreases the reserve-to-
GDP ratio. However, this difference leads to different productivity results in 
magnitude for the respective model versions of our production SOE. We discuss this 
in the calibration part. In Figure 2.2, we present the original JR formula together with 
our two extended versions for a clear analytical comparison.  
In order to compare the CD model in this chapter and the JR endowment 
benchmark, the optimal reserve formula can be written as, 
It can easily be seen that if the terms δ + gø ¿^ QK¡ + p|¬s are ignored, the CD 
model would reduce to the JR model. Therefore, both models include many similar 
determinants, such as the terms in the LHS of equation (18), the case of p = 1, the 
role of risk aversion parameter, and the link to the Greenspan-Guidotti rule as 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
2.3 Calibration 
In order to make direct comparisons between the production SOE model versions and 
the JR endowment benchmark, we use the same dataset and the same calibration 
strategy as in chapter 1. The investment rate is somewhat different in the present 
chapter, 
 
 6 + < − w∗ = 1 − ;QR1 − 77 + ;(1 − 7) 1 − ;QR 1 − 4 − 6 − 0 + 13 >*
QK™
+ ;QR. + 6 + < ; 1 − 77 + ; 1 − 7  
 
(18) 
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While in the AK model investment in sudden stops was described as 0/", it now 
includes dependence on labour via population growth in the CD version of the present 
chapter 2. Hence, investment in crisis episodes is now described as 0 + 13 /". 
As in the first chapter and the JR model, we follow Guidotti et al. (2004) 
approach for sudden stops. Therefore, we have the same sudden stop years as in the 
previous chapter. Hence, we use Table 1.2 with the same dataset and same period 
coverage (34 middle income countries over 1975-2014). 
Our calibration parameters are given in Table 2.1. Our CD model version has 
some common parameters with our AK model version, which are calibrated by 
reference to the same parameters as in the previous chapter. Following a similar 
calibration methodology as in chapter 1, we used our formulas (17), (18) and our 
benchmark equation (19) in this CD version of the production SOE model. 
We use the calibration values from chapter 1 for the size of the sudden stop, <; 
the crisis probability, 7; the output loss, 6; GDP per worker, =; the investment rate of 
economy, .; the depreciation of physical capital22, 0; capital per worker, >. Moreover, 
we used the JR calibration results for the price of the non-crisis dollar, ;; the risk-free 
world interest rate, (; and risk aversion, ). 
The CD model includes the technology parameter, *, which is calculated by 
the implied model assumptions and following again the methodology in Caselli 
(2005), as in chapter 1. To distinguish across the different definition and 
                                                
22 Following the calibration methodology in Caselli (2005), as described in chapter 1. This 
methodology to calibrate depreciation is also employed by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013). 
 #"jàâ = (1 − 6)$"[äâ − 		 0 + 13 /"ãâ + (−&"KQ)åÉâ + [−(&"KQ − 7 + á 9"]ãèâ − (−9")êëâ  
 
 
(19) 
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interpretation of the technology parameter A, we denote it henceforth by *3 for the 
labour-augmenting technology in the CD CRS model. Following Caselli (2005), in 
calibrating *3 we assume that í2∂ ||Å∂ = *3, where = is GDP per worker and > is 
capital per worker. As in chapter 1, the average GDP per worker is equal to $15141 
for our dataset from PWT (7.0) and capital per worker, >, is 2.49 times higher than 
GDP per worker. Then we calculate *3 to be equal to 10241. 
The average growth rate of population,	13, is found to be 1.5% in our dataset, 
from 1975 to 2014. The capital share of income, s, is set to 0.3 (as in Gourinchas and 
Jeanne, 2013). For the 34 middle income countries in the JR and our sample, the 
average real GDP growth rate is 4% between 1975 and 2014. We used it in 
calculation of 1+ (which is equal to 9.8%), since 1ä = 1 − s 13 + s1+. 
Based on our optimal reserves formulas (equations (17) and (18)), our CD 
CRS model quantifies the optimal ratio of reserves to output at 5.5% in the richer 
two-factor production SOE model, i.e., roughly three times higher than the AK model 
of chapter 1 but at the same time 60% lower than the JR endowment SOE model. As 
we argued in chapter 1, with the capital stock now accumulated via investment and 
potentially used as a pledge to external creditors in obtaining borrowing and therefore 
insuring better against sudden stops, the optimal reserve-to-output ratio is lower 
relative to an otherwise similar endowment economy in the endogenous growth AK 
model. Differently from chapter 1, however, adding labour and constant population 
growth, consistent with a long-run BGP in neoclassical models of exogenous growth 
and with sustained per capita income growth, results in a lower per capita pledge and, 
hence, a higher optimal reserve-to-output ratio in the CD model relative to the AK 
model. 
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Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between the optimal level of 
international reserves and its determinants for the CD model.23 Similarly to the 
corresponding Figure 1.3 in chapter 1, this figure also shows the sensitivity of our 
results to the key determinants of the optimal reserve-to-output ratio. It is based on the 
optimal reserve formula (17) and the reported calibrations. As can be seen in the 
respective panels of Figure 2.1, our results suggest that the optimal reserve-to-GDP 
ratio depends positively on some of its key determinants, as was in fact in chapter 1 
and the JR endowment SOE benchmark, such as: (i) the size of the sudden stop; (ii) 
the output cost of a sudden stop; (iii) the probability of sudden stops; (iv) the world 
interest rate; (v) the coefficient of relative risk aversion; (vi) the depreciation rate of 
capital and – in our extension to a CD production in the present chapter 2 – also on 
(vii) population growth and (viii) the capital-labour ratio. On the other hand, and 
notably given the objective of the present chapter, our analysis revealed some novel 
results, as follows: the optimal reserve-to-GDP ratio depends negatively on: (i) the 
investment rate, as in chapter 1; and now on the additional determinants highlighted 
by the CD production SOE model of the present chapter 2, namely; (ii) labour-
augmenting technology; (iii) the growth rate of capital; (iv) the capital share in output. 
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter revisits the role of investment and production on optimal international 
reserves in SOEs. We derive an optimal reserve-to-output ratio in a two-factor CD 
production model where labour and population growth is included as well as labour-
augmenting productivity in addition to investment in physical capital. We, 
consequently, focus on the importance of these additional determinants of optimal 
                                                
23 A summary of the JR model and its extensions can be seen in Figure 2.2. 
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reserves, comparing them to AK technology model and the JR endowment 
benchmark. 
As in chapter 1, the optimal reserve-to-output ratio decreases with the 
investment rate and the growth rate of capital but increases with the depreciation rate. 
However now, along the balanced growth path (BGP) in chapter 2, it also increases 
with population growth and the capital-labour ratio but decreases with labour 
productivity and the capital share in output. Given our plausible calibration of the 
labour-augmenting productivity parameter following the methodology proposed in 
Caselli (2005), the CRS CD model quantifies the optimal ratio of reserves to output at 
5.5% in the richer two-factor production SOE model, i.e., roughly three times higher 
than the AK model of chapter 1. Yet, this value is at the same time 60% lower than 
that found in the endowment SOE model by Jeanne and Rancière (2011). Along the 
interpretation we proposed in chapter 1, our intuition here again is that with the 
capital stock now accumulated via investment and potentially used as a pledge to 
external creditors in obtaining borrowing and therefore insuring better against sudden 
stops, the optimal reserve-to-output ratio is lower relative to an otherwise similar 
endowment economy in the endogenous growth AK model. But now differently from 
chapter 1, further adding labour and constant population growth, consistent with a 
long-run BGP in neoclassical models of exogenous growth and with sustained per 
capita income growth, results in a lower per capita pledge and, hence, a higher 
optimal reserve-to-output ratio in the CD model relative to the AK model. This is, 
essentially, because capital accumulation has to make up for not only deprecyaition of 
capital but also population growth in the CD exogenous BGP model version of our 
production SOE relative to its AK endogenous perpetual growth model version. 
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
 
2.A.1 Figures 
 
Figure 2.1: Optimal Reserves-to-GDP Ratio as a Function of Its Key Determinants in 
the CRS-Labour Augmented Cobb-Douglas Model	
 
Source: Author’s calculation, using data from IMF’s International Financial Statistics, Penn World 
Table 7.0 and World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
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Figure 2.2: Optimal Reserves-to-Output Formula in the JR Endowment SOE 
Benchmark and in Our Extension to CD Production: Analytical Comparison 
 
 
JR Endowment SOE Model 
 
 
w∗ = 6 + < − (1 − ( − 11 + 1 <)(1 − ;QR)1 − 77 + ; 1 − 7 (1 − ;Q/R)  
 
 
 
 
 
                        Our Extended SOE Model with AK Production    
                          
w∗ = 9"*/" = 6 + < − 1 − ;
QR 1 − < ( − .* − 01 + .* − 0 + 0* − ;QR.1 − 77 + ;(1 − 7) 1 − ;QR  
 
                                  
 
Our Extended SOE Model with Labour-Augmenting CD Production 
 
 
 
 
  
             w∗ = ëâ+â∂(É3â)|Å∂ = ¢@ûK QKûüÅ[ |Å∂ ∏µ∂∏∑]|[ |Å∂ ∏µ∂∏∑] QK{|} @(Ç@¥µ) π† |Å∂K{|}jQK ~~Ä(|Å~) QK{|}   
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2.A.2 Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Calibration Parameters in CD Model 
 
Parameters CRS-Labour-Augmenting 
Cobb-Douglas 
Range of Variation 
 
Technology 
 *3 = 10241  
Size of Sudden Stop < = 0.10 [0, 0.30] 
Probability of a Sudden Stop 7 = 0.10 [0, 0.24] 
Output Loss 6 = 0.0.65 [0,0.2] 
Price of a Non-Crisis Dollar ; = 0.855  
Potential Output Growth 1 = 0.04 [0, 0.25] 
Depreciation Rate 0 = 0.06 [0, 1] 
Risk Free Rate ( = 0.05  
Risk Aversion ) = 2 [1, 10] 
Growth Rate of Population 13 		= 0.015 [0, 0.11] 
Growth rate of Capital 1+ 		= 0.098  
Capital-Labour Ratio > = 37701  
GDP per Worker = = 15141  
Capital Share of Output s = 0.3 [0,1] 
Investment Rate 0.24 [0, 0.48] 
 
 
Source: Authors calculation, using data from International Financial Statistics, Penn World Table 7.0 
and World Bank Development Indicators. 
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2.B Model Derivation 
 
With the CD labour-augmenting technology, output is given by 
 $" = Z /", *©"; s = /"™(*©")QK™, 
 
which can be written alternatively in terms of output per capita (or output per worker, 
provided the usual implicit assumption in neoclassical growth theory that the labour 
force participation rate is constant and unitary that we used in the main text),	=" ≡ äâ3â, 
or also in terms of capital per worker or the capital-labour ratio, >" ≡ +â3â: 
 
=" = ƒ >", *©"; s = *QK™ +â∂3â∂ = *QK™>"™. 
 
In this model version, exogenous constant population growth at net rate 13 is 
assumed:24 
 
∆3â|3â = 13		 and ©" = (1 + 13)"©M. 
 
To express the production function in % terms, that is, in growth rates, take natural 
logarithms from both sides in period t and t-1, and then subtract to form the respective 
first log-differences: 
 ¨X$" = 1 − s ¨X* + ¨X©" + s¨X/" − s¨X©" 
                                                
24 ©M is the population level in some base period. 
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 ¨X$"KQ = 1 − s ¨X* + ¨X©"KQ + s¨X/"KQ − s¨X©"KQ 
 ¨X$" − ¨X$"KQ = ¨X©" − ¨X©"KQ + s ¨X/" − ¨X/"KQ − s ¨X©" − ¨X©"KQ  
 ¨X$" − ¨X$"KQ = 1 − s ¨X©" − ¨X©"KQ + s ¨X/" − ¨X/"KQ  
 Ø¨X$" = 1 − s Ø¨X©" + sØ¨X/" 
 1ä = 1 − s 13 + s1+, 
 1ä = Ø¨X$" = 1 − s 13 + s1+ 
 
or, equivalently, 
 1ä = Ø¨X$" = 1 − s 13 + s . äâ+â − 0 . 
The ‘normal time’ budget constraint (superscript n) of the private sector is given by 
 #"[ = $"[ ∙ − %"[ + &"[ − 1 + ( &"KQ[ + '"[, 
and %"[ = .$"[ ∙ . 
 
The rate of growth of capital per capita, >" = +â3â, is then 
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12 = ∆>"@Q>" = ∆/"@Q/" − ∆©"@Q©" = . =">" − 0 − 13,	 
hence 
=">" = $"©"/"©" = $"/" = 12 + 0 + 13. . 
 
From the last equality above, investment in normal times is 
 .$" = (12 + 0 + 13)/". 
 
Note that the definition of STED now implies 
 
< ≡ 1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + ( 	4. 
 
Replacing investment, we can write the normal-time budget constraint of the private 
sector as 
 #"[ = $"[ ∙ − .$"[ ∙ + &"[ − 1 + ( &"KQ[ + '"[. 
 
With CRS Cobb-Douglas technology, output is given by $"[ ∙ = Z /", *©"; s =/"™(*©")QK™ and using &"[ = Q@ QK™ ¥µ@™¥∑Q@ù 4$"[ ∙ = <$"[ ∙  and '"[ = −8", we 
further obtain (successively): 
 
#"[ = /"™ *©" QK™ − ./"™ *©" QK™ + 1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + ( 4/"™ *©" QK™ 
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− 1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ 4/"KQ™ (*©"KQ)QK™ − 8" 
 #"[ = /"™(*©")QK™ − ./"™(*©")QK™ + </"™(*©")QK™ − 4/"™(*©")QK™ − 8" 
 #"[ = /"™(*©")QK™ − ./"™ *©" QK™ + </"™ *©" QK™− < 1 + (1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ /"™(*©")QK™ − 8" 
 
#"[ = 1 − . + < 1 − 1 + (1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ /"™ *©" QK™ − 8" 
 
#"[ = 1 − . + < 1 − s 13 + s1+ − (1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ /"™(*©")QK™ − 8" 
 #"[ = 1 − . − < ùK QK™ ¥µ@™¥∑Q@ QK™ ¥µ@™¥∑ /"™(*©")QK™ − 8". 
 
The ‘sudden stop’ budget constraint (superscript s) of the private sector is given by 
 #"j = 1 − 6 $"[ ∙ − 	%"j − 1 + ( &"KQj + 	'"j, 
 
and we assume that the capital-labour ratio (or per capita capital) does not grow in 
sudden stops, equivalent to writing: 
 >"@Qj = >"j 
 12 = ∆2â|2â = 0 results in . íâ2â − 0 − 13 = 0, 
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that is, . ≈âµâ∑âµâ = 0 + 13 
 
. $"/" = 0 + 13 
so that 
 .$" = 0 + 13 /", 
 
which implies, in the CD model, 
 %"j = (0 + 13)/". 
 
Replacing investment, we can write the sudden-stop budget constraint of the private 
sector as 
 #"j = 1 − 6 $"[ ∙ − (0 + 13)/" + &"j − 1 + ( &"KQj + '"j. 
 
With CRS Cobb-Douglas technology, output is given by $"[ ∙ = Z /", *©"; s =/"™(*©")QK™ and using &"j = 0, &"KQj = Q@ QK™ ¥µ@™¥∑Q@ù 4$"KQ[ ∙ = <$"KQ[ ∙  and '"j =9" − 8", we further obtain (successively): 
 #"j = 1 − 6 /"™ *©" QK™ − 0 + 13 /" − 1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ 4/"KQ™ *©"KQ QK™+ 9" − 8" 
 
	 98	
#"j = 1 − 6 /"™(*©")QK™ − (0 + 13)/" − 4/"™(*©")QK™+9" − 8" 
 #"j = 1 − 6 /"™(*©")QK™ − (0 + 13)/"− 1 + (1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ <	/"™(*©")QK™+9" − 8" 
 
#"j = −6 − (0 + 13)/"/"™(*©")QK™ + 1 − 1 + (1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ < /"™(*©")QK™ + 9" − 8" 
 
#"j = −6 − (0 + 13)/"/"™(*©")QK™ + 1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ − 1 − (1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ < /"™(*©")QK™ + 9"− 8" 
 
#"j = −6 − (0 + 13)/"/"™(*©")QK™ + 1 − s 13 + s1+ − (1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ < /"™(*©")QK™ + 9" − 8" 
 
#"j = −6 − (0 + 13)/"/"™(*©")QK™ − < ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ /"™(*©")QK™ + 9" − 8" 
 
Therefore, from first order conditions, the optimal level of reserves as a ratio of 
output can be expressed as: 
 
;QR 1 − . − < ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ /"™(*©")QK™ − 8"
= −6 − (0 + 13)/"/"™(*©")QK™ − < ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ /"™(*©")QK™+ 9" − 8" 
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;QR 1 − . − < ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ /"™(*©")QK™
− −6 − (0 + 13)/"/"™(*©")QK™ − < ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ /"™(*©")QK™= 9" − 8" + ;QR8" 
 
;QR 1 − . − ;QR< ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ + 6 + (0 + 13)/"/"™(*©")QK™
+ < ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ /"™(*©")QK™ = 9" − 1 − ;QR 8" 
 
;QR 1 − . + 1 − ;QR < ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ + 6 + (0
+ 13) /"*©" QK™ /"™(*©")QK™ = 9" − 1 − ;QR 77 + ;(1 − 7)9" 
 
;QR 1 − . + 1 − ;QR < ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ + 6 + (0
+ 13) >o.* 1−s /"™(*©")QK™ = 1 − 1 − ;QR 77 + ;(1 − 7) 9" 
 
And, finally, we obtain the optimal reserves-to-output ratio, w∗, under the CD 
technology case in the production SOE we analysed: 
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w∗ = 9"/"™(*©")QK™
= 6 + < ( − [ 1 − s 13 + s1+]1 + [ 1 − s 13 + s1+] 1 − ;QR +;QR 1 − . + (0 + 13) >* 1−s1 − 77 + ;(1 − 7) 1 − ;QR , 
 
An alternative equivalent expression where the parameter < appears also additively as 
in the original JR optimal reserves expression can be obtained, as follows. 
Since, #"j = 1 − 6 /"™(*©")QK™ − (0 + 13)/" − Q@ùQ@ QK™ ¥µ@™¥∑ <	/"™(*©")QK™+9" − 8", 
 
we could write 
 
#"j = (1 − 6) − (0 + 13) /"*©" QK™ − 1 + (1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ < /"™(*©")QK™+ 9" − 8" 
 
#"j = (1 − 6) − (0 + 13) >o.* 1−s −
Q@ù@ Q@ QK™ ¥µ@™¥∑ K[Q@ QK™ ¥µ@™¥∑]Q@ QK™ ¥µ@™¥∑ < /"™(*©")QK™ + 9" − 8"  
 
#"j = 1 − 6 − (0 + 13) >* 1−s − 1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ <
− 1 + ( − 1 − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ < /"™(*©")QK™ + 9" − 8" 
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#"j = 1 − 6 − (0 + 13) >* 1−s − < − ùK QK™ ¥µ@™¥∑Q@ QK™ ¥µ@™¥∑ < /"™(*©")QK™ + 9" − 8". 
 
Then, the optimal level of reserves in terms of output can be derived as follows: 
 
;QR 1 − . − < ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ /"™(*©")QK™ − 8"
= 1 − 6 − (0 + 13) >* 1−s − <
− ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ < /"™(*©")QK™ + 9" − 8" 
 
;QR 1 − . − < ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ /"™(*©")QK™ − ;QR8"
= 1 − 6 − (0 + 13) >* 1−s − <
− ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ < /"™(*©")QK™ + 9" − 8" 
 
;QR 1 − . − < ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ /"™(*©")QK™
− 1 − 6 − (0 + 13) >* QK™ − <
− ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ < /"™(*©")QK™ = 9" − 8" + ;QR8" 
 
;QR 1 − . − ;QR< ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ − 1 − 6 + < + (0 + 13) >* QK™
+ < ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ /"™(*©")QK™ = 9" − 1 − ;QR 8" 
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;QR − ;QR. + 1 − ;QR < ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ − 1 + 6 + < + (0
+ 13) >* QK™ /"™(*©")QK™ = 9" − 1 − ;QR 77 + ;(1 − 7) 9" 
 
− 1 − ;QR − ;QR. + 1 − ;QR < ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ + 6 + < + (0
+ 13) >* QK™ /"™(*©")QK™ = 9" − 1 − ;QR 77 + ;(1 − 7) 9" 
 
6 + < + 0 + 13 >* QK™ − ;QR. − 1 − ;QR 1 − < ( − 1 − s 13 + s1+1 + 1 − s 13 + s1+ /"™(*©")QK™
= 9" − 1 − ;QR 77 + ;(1 − 7) 9" 
 
6 + < + 0 + 13 2É QK™ − ;|}. − 1 − ;|} 1 − < ùK QK™ ¥µ@™¥∑Q@ QK™ ¥µ@™¥∑ /"™ *©" QK™ =1 − 1 − ;|} ÑÑ@{ QKÑ 9"  
 
w∗ = 9"/"™(*©")QK™
= 6 + < − 1 − < ( − [ 1 − s 13 + s1+]1 + [ 1 − s 13 + s1+] 1 − ;QR + (0 + 13) >* QK™ − ;QR.1 − 77 + ;(1 − 7) 1 − ;QR . 
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Chapter 3: Heterogeneity across the Empirical Distribution 
of International Reserves in Small Open Economies 
Abstract 
 
This chapter examines empirically the key determinants of international reserves in a 
panel of 26 middle income economies over 1970-2014, with a primary interest to 
uncover potential common and idiosyncratic characteristics. To this end, we first 
estimate a pooled OLS regression and a panel data fixed effects model. Secondly, we 
use quantile regression techniques to analyse the variation of reserve holding 
determinants across the reserve holdings distribution in our sample. In particular, we 
apply F-tests to check the uniformity of coefficients in several inter-quantile 
regressions and we reject null hypothesis that the models for different quantiles of the 
reserve distribution in our sample were similar. This shows that the empirical models 
estimating the relative contribution of each of the key determinants of reserve 
holdings should consider the country specific features of middle income economies. 
Moreover, our empirical work uncovers a significant positive effect of the investment 
rate on actual reserve holdings, while the theory in chapters 1 and 2 derived 
analytically a negative effect of the same determinant but now to optimal reserves. 
While this may seem surprising, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) also find empirically 
opposite results to these predicted by neoclassical growth theory under a labour 
augmenting CD technology as in our chapter 2. Finally, while our theoretical chapters 
1 and 2 derive the ‘optimal’ level of international reserves as a ratio to output, the 
dataset really measures the de facto level of international reserves-to-GDP prevailing 
in the countries of our sample. As the optimal reserve ratio quantified at the level of 
5.5% of GDP in chapter 2 is found near the bottom of the empirical distribution of 
actual reserves in our dataset (Figure 1), this fact may well indicate that actual 
reserves are excessive relative to GDP for many middle income countries, as claimed 
notably by Aizenman and Marion (2004) and Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009). 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: C3, F31, F32, F37, F41, O57 
Keywords: Reserves, Quantile Regression, Emerging Markets, Sudden Stops, Debt, 
Investment.  
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3.1 Introduction 
The reasons behind the rapid accumulation of reserves have been one of the most 
debatable and attractive research areas for the past 20 years. The main question is how 
much an economy should rely on international reserves. Even there is no single 
answer to that question, reserve holdings depend on their determinants. In this 
chapter, we add some control variables that are common in the applied literature to 
our key theoretically derived determinants to analyse empirically the reasons behind 
accumulating reserves. In effect, we find a high degree of heterogeneity in reserve 
holdings in middle income countries. 
In line with our theoretical chapters, the main contribution of this empirical 
chapter consists in testing the relative importance of the central determinants of 
reserves derived in our production SOE model versions, such as investment, GDP 
growth, the external debt-to-GDP ratio and a sudden stop dummy. To do this, we add 
these theoretically relevant variables, notably the investment rate that was missing 
from earlier applied work, to the typical explanatory variables in the standard 
empirical models of reserve accumulation (Frenkel and Jovanovic, 1981). In the 
previous two chapters, we show analytically and quantitatively that the investment 
rate is a factor that reduces the reserves-to-GDP ratio. In addition, as control 
variables, we examine the role of common reserve holding indicators, such as export 
volatility, trade openness, the broad money-to-GDP ratio, the volatility of the nominal 
effective exchange rate (NEER). We also examine some country-specific factors 
coming from the political economy literature, such as political stability and corruption 
(see, e.g., Aizenman and Marion, 2004). As a first pass, we use pooled OLS and 
fixed-effects panel data techniques. Then, in order to check heterogeneity in the 
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reserve holding distribution in our sample of 26 middle income countries, we use 
quantile-regression analysis. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that presents the 
unobserved cross-country preferences on international reserves holdings that 
incorporates the role played by the investment rate in middle income economies on 
explicitly derived (in the preceding two chapters) theoretical grounds.25 As in Frenkel 
and Jovanovic (1981) and Mwase (2012), we estimate a “buffer-stock model” using 
pooled OLS and fixed-effects panel data regressions. 
This empirical chapter relates to similar work by Sula (2011), Ghosh et. al. 
(2012) and Mwase (2012), since these authors also emphasize the heterogeneity in 
reserve holdings across emerging market economies (EMEs). All these papers stress 
the advantages of using quantile regression over the usual pooled OLS estimation in 
the context of middle income countries. 
Mwase (2012) analyses the determinants of reserves by comparing EMEs and 
small islands. The author finds a wide difference across EMEs in terms of their 
estimated slope coefficients in a standard OLS regression. Therefore, the paper 
suggests to use quantile regression to avoid this problem.26 We use the same 
methodology, but our view is broader in that we include the theoretically derived 
investment rate as a key determinant to the standard empirical reserve determinants, 
focusing exclusively on middle income countries. Moreover, in running these 
                                                
25 Rodrik (2006) also attempts to explain the relationship between reserves and investment, but in a 
purely descriptive policy-oriented paper. He claims that high level of debt might require better risk 
sharing, financial system and higher domestic investment, though he finds that the link between gross 
capital formation and short term capital flows is unclear. In this perspective, he shows external 
financing is overrated as in Aizenman (2006). However, external financing is an important factor, 
especially, for the countries that do not accumulate foreign reserves via current account surpluses. If a 
country increases reserves when it runs a current account deficit, its production is highly dependent on 
external financing. 
26 The quantile regression techniques have been developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978) in order to 
solve the potential sample selection bias in OLS. Koenker and Hallock (2001) explain why quantile 
regressions are preferable to OLS in subsamples (Ghosh et. al., 2012).  
	 106	
regressions we also test empirically some of the other theoretically derived reserves 
determinants that, differently from investment, have already been included in some 
empirical work. 
The analogous empirical approach employed by Ghosh et. al. (2012) is more 
related to the motives behind reserve holdings rather than their determinants. They 
find that reserve holding motives have changed over time from current account 
shocks in the 1980s to sudden stops of capital inflows in EMEs. In addition, they state 
that the motives behind reserve holdings depend on where a particular country stands 
in the empirical reserve distribution. The present chapter does not focus on the 
motives behind reserve holdings; instead, we are interested in the determinants of 
reserves, and in potentially uncovering heterogeneity across the middle income 
countries in our sample. 
Sula (2011) tests the determinants of reserves for 108 EMEs and reveals 
remarkable differences. He finds that standard OLS regressions lead to statistically 
insignificant results at different quantiles of the reserve holdings distribution. His 
dataset is broader than our dataset in terms of the number of countries, since in this 
empirical chapter we restricted our sample to a subset of 26 middle income economies 
out of the original JR sample of 34 such economies, by excluding the high-income 
countries from the JR sample, as well as Botswana as an outlier. 
In line with Mwase (2012), we present testing of slopes of the quantile 
regressions in order to determine whether there are any statistically significant 
differences between lower quantile economies and higher quantile economies in terms 
of reserve accumulation variables. This is a particularly important question since 
slopes have effect on the respective elasticities in the regression. If there are 
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differences between quantiles, the potential heterogeneity across the international 
reserve distribution can be hidden by simply running standard OLS regressions. 
Our results, using a ‘buffer stock model’ in explaining reserve holdings, 
suggest that, in particular, the investment rate is an important positive determinant of 
reserve holdings in middle income countries, together with financial depth and the 
import share in GDP. Having added investment vulnerabilities to the standard 
empirical literature and taking the share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP as a 
proxy for the investment rate, we find the latter to have significant and positive effects 
on reserve holdings. Current account balances in terms of GDP also play a positive 
role in building up reserves; in order to provide consumption smoothing, countries 
tend to hold more reserves. In other words, current account adjustments in response to 
shocks and financial depth are significant factors in reserve holdings. We also find 
that NEER volatility requires a lower level of international reserves, as intervention in 
foreign exchange markets is not as much needed to stabilise the NEER and financial 
markets. The broad money-to-GDP ratio is another important factor affecting 
positively reserve holdings in most cases: countries with a higher ratio tend to have 
higher reserves. This can be seen as a stylized fact of reserve holdings, in line with the 
literature (Mwase, 2012). 
Using quantile regression techniques, our results suggest that there are 
significant differences across middle income countries in terms of the reserve 
holdings distribution. Our findings from inter-quantile regressions show there are 
significant differences in the investment rate, the import share in GDP, and short term 
external debt (STED)-to-GDP. Using inter-quantile differences, F-test results imply 
that we can reject the null hypothesis of constant coefficients along the distribution. 
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We only found an insignificant F-test result for 25th-50th inter-quantile regression 
while all remaining inter-quantiles show significant F-test results. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 examines empirically 
what are the main determinants of international reserves in EMEs. Section 3.3 reports 
our data analysis, the empirical methodology and our testing of cross-country 
differences with pooled OLS, fixed-effects panel data and quantile regression. Section 
3.4 presents our main findings from the regressions and section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Empirical Determinants of International Reserves 
As we saw in the theoretical chapters already, the determinants of international 
reserves are debatable in the huge extant literature. Even if there is a big consensus on 
the most important variables such as GDP, openness, probability of sudden stops, 
recent theories are still far away from convincingly explaining the rapid accumulation 
of international reserves observed after the East Asian crisis of 1997-1998 (Jeanne 
and Rancière, 2011). In this section, we discuss the main determinants of reserve 
holdings for middle income countries uncovered in the large empirical literature. 
It is hard to understand why countries hold high level of reserves without 
understanding the distinction between the benefits and opportunity cost of reserves 
(see Feldstein, 1999; Aizenman, 2006; De Beaufort Wijnholds and Sondergaard, 
2007). EMEs hold a high level of reserves since they have experienced sudden stops 
of capital flows and possible negative welfare effects (i.e., reducing output and 
consumption) of losing access to financial liquidity in that crisis period. The motives 
behind reserve holdings can be precautionary (Jeanne and Rancière, 2008; Jeanne and 
Rancière, 2011), mercantilist (Aizenman and Lee, 2007) or country-specific 
requirements. The main discussion is about why some countries hold a high level of 
reserves and what are their main determinants. To address these questions 
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empirically, our dependent variable naturally is the reserve-to-GDP ratio; but what 
should the independent variables be? 
The most traditional variables in the literature explaining reserve holdings, 
starting from Heller’s (1976) seminal paper and up to most recent work (as outlined 
below), are ‘current account’, ‘capital account’, ‘exchange rate regime’, ‘opportunity 
costs of reserves’, ‘economic size’, ‘experiences from previous crisis’. Furthermore, 
there is a growing literature on ‘the role of institutions’, ‘political variables’ and 
‘economic growth’ (Aizenman and Marion, 2004; Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2006; 
Bonfiglioli, 2008; Cheung and Ito, 2009; Benigno and Fornaro, 2012; Cheng, 2015). 
In terms of testing the role of investment in reserve holdings - the centre of our 
interest in this third, empirical chapter, arising from the two preceding theoretical 
chapters - we use the investment share in GDP (also defined as gross fixed capital 
formation) as a proxy for the investment rate (which is also done by Rodrik, 2006 in 
his policy-oriented analysis). 
Current account shocks are key factors in reserve holdings. In that view, 
international reserves provide smooth consumption intertemporally. Imports and 
exports are mostly used as proxies in order to capture shocks to current account 
(Mwase, 2012). The literature27 converges to a positive correlation between reserves 
and current account shocks. We used share of imports in GDP, exports volatility and 
the degree of trade openness as proxies for current account shocks. 
Another important determinant coming out of the literature is capital account 
shocks. Radelet and Sachs (2000) shows the importance of capital inflows since most 
of the economic activity depends on foreign liquidity in EMEs. Hence, any sudden 
decrease in capital flows might lead to enormous negative effects on the real 
                                                
27	See Flood and Marion (2001); Aizenman and Marion (2004); Aizenman et al. (2007).	
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economy. Aizenman et. al. (2007) have discussed the role of shocks on capital 
account in a financial crisis, in particular with reference to the East Asian crisis. By 
reducing output and consumption, sudden stops of capital flows caused a negative 
welfare effects in the East Asian economies between the mid-1990s and the beginning 
of 2000s. 
Even if there is no consensus on how to capture ‘capital account shocks’, the 
literature mostly focuses on three key variables, such as broad money and short-term 
debt to reserves ratios and capital flows. First of all, broad money might be a signal of 
potential risks on the pressure of reserve holdings via currency mismatches, bank 
deposits depletion and capital outflows (Mwase, 2012). Showing evidence of a 
‘tequila crisis’, Calvo (1996) states that the broad money-to-reserves ratio is one of 
the key indicators of financial vulnerability. Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001) also 
emphasize the role of the ratio in reserve adequacy. Obstfeld et. al. (2010) use the 
broad money-to-GDP ratio as a proxy for financial development and find significant 
results. Secondly, short term debt plays a critical role. If the ratio of short term debt to 
reserves is high, it might be an indicator of more vulnerability to economic crisis 
(Sachs et. al. 1996). Lastly, capital flows such as FDI and portfolio flows, carry 
importance in the literature,28 although the results depend on the type of capital flows 
(Mwase, 2012). 
The exchange rate is another highly used variable in empirical work on 
reserve holdings. In the literature, it affects the reserve holdings in two ways, namely, 
via the exchange-rate regime and via the volatility of the exchange rate. The earlier 
literature on reserve holdings suggests that, if an economy follows a pegged 
exchange-rate regime and in order to defend the value of its domestic currency, a 
                                                
28	See, e.g., Feldstein (1999); Aizenman et. al. (2007); Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013). 
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country needs a larger reserve stock than a country following a flexible exchange-rate 
regime (see Heller, 1966; Clark, 1970; Kelly, 1970; Frenkel, 1974; Edwards, 1985). 
However, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) state that the distinction between a floating 
exchange-rate regime and pure fixed exchange-rate regime is not very clear in reality, 
since some countries have described themselves as operating freely flexible exchange 
regime economies (de jure), while actually (de facto) they are not. This problem leads 
to a kind of measurement problem (Mwase, 2012). Another aspect of the exchange 
rate is its volatility. Flood and Marion (2001) and Aizenman and Marion (2003) have 
discussed that even countries with flexible exchange-rate regimes still keep a high 
level of reserves in order to reduce exchange rate volatility. Therefore, the nominal 
effective exchange rate (NEER) volatility could be used as a proxy to show the 
relationship between reserves and exchange rate. 
The opportunity cost of reserve holdings is also another important component 
of the determinants of international reserves. It has been particularly discussed in the 
earlier literature (Heller, 1966; Clark, 1970; Kelly, 1970; Frenkel, 1974), which 
calculates the opportunity cost of reserve holdings in real terms, such as via the 
marginal productivity of capital, but with increasing financial globalisation, the 
opportunity cost has been calculated more and more frequently in financial terms 
(Bahmani-Oskooee and Brown, 2002; Jeanne and Rancière, 2006; Jeanne and 
Rancière, 2011). However, both approaches in the reserve literature reach a consensus 
on the relationship between the opportunity cost of reserve holdings29 and the level of 
international reserves, agreeing on an expected negative relationship. 
The international reserve literature uses ‘economic size’ as a scaling variable 
                                                
29	Given the overall consensus in the literature, and differences in calculation of opportunity cost, in 
this study we excluded this variable in the regressions.	
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in order to make better comparisons among countries. The traditional approach30 uses 
‘population’ as a proxy for ‘economic size’. The more recent studies (e.g., Flood and 
Marion, 2001; Choi et. al., 2007; Delatte and Fouquau, 2011; Mwase, 2012) employ 
‘the volume of international transactions’ as a proxy for economic size rather than 
population. Both approaches imply a positive relationship between economic size and 
reserve holdings. 
Following financial liberalisation, many countries faced economic crises and 
experienced a loss of access to international liquidity with sudden reversals of capital 
flows. These experiences made most EMEs more risk averse. Therefore, economies 
with previous sudden stop episodes usually hold more reserves than their counterparts 
(Jeanne and Rancière, 2011). The literature investigates the effect of such a crisis on 
reserve holdings and takes into account a dummy variable using either the exchange 
market pressure (EMP) index (Eichengreen et. al.,1996; Mwase, 2012) or the Guidotti 
et al. (2004) approach (Jeanne and Rancière, 2006; Jeanne and Rancière, 2011). We 
use the second methodology since our analysis is based on the JR sample. Therefore, 
as in the preceding chapters, we define sudden stops as a more than 5% decrease in 
the ratio of capital flows to GDP relative to the previous year. 
Institutions or governments (political credibility) are also commonly 
employed explanatory variables in the recent reserve holdings literature (Aizenman 
and Marion, 2004; Cheung and Ito, 2009). This literature explains that economies 
need a higher level of international reserves if they have weaker institutions or 
government. The reason behind this is that such a country needs to gain international 
reputation, credibility and confidence. Corruption is also another issue for that kind of 
                                                
30	This approach starts from Heller (1966) and almost all papers in the earlier literature use population 
as a proxy for economic size. However, it can still be seen in the more recent literature on reserve 
holding (e.g., Aizenman and Marion, 2003).	
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economies and the literature shows that less corrupted countries need less reserves 
(Aizenman and Marion, 2004; Cheung and Ito, 2009; Mwase, 2012). 
The recent literature also focuses on the role of economic growth dynamics on 
reserve holdings (Bonfiglioli, 2008; Kramer, 2010; Benigno and Fornaro, 2012; 
Cheng, 2015). But this is at the same time a debatable factor, since economic growth 
has been found to generally have an ambiguous effect on reserve holdings. 
 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
 
We examine, initially, the determinants of reserves for middle income countries using 
pooled OLS and panel data fixed effects looking at several alternative regressions. 
We, then, benefited from the ‘quantile regression method’ in order to test the 
differences in coefficients at different quantiles of the reserve holdings distribution 
across our sample. 
Firstly, we construct an unbalanced panel data model with fixed effect31 
including 26 middle income economies.32 The data are annual and selected from 26 
middle income countries from the World Bank classification, and covering the period 
from 1970 to 2014. We, thus, work with 26 individual countries over 45 years. 
However, not all variables are available in this time span. Therefore, due to lack of 
data we have missing variables. The description of our regression variables and our 
                                                
31	We employed the Hausman (1978) test in order to decide which model is more suitable, fixed effects 
or random effects. The results from this test indicate that our regression should be estimated by panel 
data fixed effects rather than random effects. Therefore, we only present the fixed effects results. 
Although we present the pooled OLS results in table 3.3, the pooled OLS method gives inconsistent 
estimators if the true model is the fixed effects (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 702-703). 
32	The original JR (2011) sample consists of 34 countries, and we used it for the calibration in the 
theoretical chapters 1 and 2. In this empirical chapter 3, we excluded 7 high income countries from the 
sample. We also excluded Botswana since it has an outlier influence -based on Grubbs’ (1969) test- in 
reserves series from 1985 to 2010 in the JR dataset. We, therefore, only studied 26 high and low 
middle income countries in the present chapter 3.	
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sample can be seen in Table 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Our data is mostly calculated 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) and World Economic Outlook (WOE). 
We consider the ‘reserve-to-GDP’ ratio as a dependent variable, defined as 
wA," = 9A,"$A,"  
where 9A," is international reserves minus gold and $A," is gross domestic product 
(GDP) of for country ∆ in period o. International reserves and GDP are both measured 
in nominal US dollars. 
In line with Mwase (2012), our baseline empirical specification is given by, wA," = uM + uQ ã«ä A," + u» ãä A," + u… Ø «»ä A," + u jùÀÃÕ"ä A," + uŒ ©II9v A," +uœ#U + o + –A,"          (1) 
 
where %— is imports,	% is investment, —2 is broad money, Ø is first difference, .(U“”o is short-term external debt (STED), ©II9v is nominal effective exchange 
rate (NEER) volatility, #U is a dummy variable for sudden stops for ∆ = 1,… ,© and o = 1,… , Ö, where © and Ö display the cross-section and the time dimensions of the 
panel. Our dummy variable is equal to 1 if a sudden stop hits the country and 0 
otherwise. o represents the time dummies and –A," is the error term. 
We also estimate an alternative panel models including additional variables33 
such as government effectiveness, political stability, the growth rate of real GDP per 
capita, current account balance, openness, and export volatility, in order to check their 
importance in reserve holdings. 
                                                
33	Since we have an unbalanced panel dataset, we focused on two main approaches in the literature, 
namely, Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root test and Fischer-type unit root test. Our unit root test results indicate 
that our variables such as volatility in the exchange rate, the growth rate of GDP per capita, the current 
account balance to GDP, export volatility, government effectiveness and political stability are all 
stationary. Moreover, the reserves-to-GDP ratio, the share of imports in GDP, the STED-to-GDP ratio 
and trade openness are trend stationary. These results are available upon request.	
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Based on our baseline specification (1), we first estimated a panel data model 
from 1970 to 2014, and then we estimated several alternative panel regressions in 
order to test the effects of each variable as a determinant of reserve holdings. Doing 
this, we are able to compare the alternative specifications. 
Secondly, in order to empirically investigate heterogeneity in reserve holdings 
in our sample of middle income countries, we applied quantile regression methods 
developed by Koenker and Bassett (1978). Since the OLS regression does not allow 
changes across the conditional distribution of the dependent variable, the effect of the 
independent variables varies along the conditional distribution and can be analysed by 
the quantile regression method.34 
The latter is applicable to reserve holdings since we would like to compare the 
respective coefficients at different quantiles of the reserve distribution as in Sula 
(2011), Mwase (2012) and Ghosh et. al. (2012). To do this, we have to allow different 
elasticities, and so we re-write our equation (1) as follows, 
 wA," = uM 6 + uQ 6 ã«ä A," + u» 6 ãä A," + u… 6 Ø «»ä A," + u 6 jùÀÃÕ"ä A," +uŒ 6 ©II9v A," + uœ 6 #U + o + –A,"       (2) 
 
where 6 is the weight given to the reserve level and all slope coefficients are a 
function of 6. It can be assumed that a higher level of reserves is linked with greater 6, ceteris paribus (Mwase, 2012). 
   
                                                
34 See appendix 3.A for a brief explanation of the quantile and inter-quantile regression approach. 
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3.4 Empirical Results  
In this section, we present first our estimation results of the standard pooled OLS and 
the panel data fixed effects models. Secondly, we report the empirical results from the 
‘quantile’ and ‘inter-quantile’ regressions. We estimate the models using the Stata and 
use ‘robust’ option to obtain heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, namely the 
Huber/White standard errors (also known as ‘sandwich estimators’). 
 
3.4.1 Empirical Results from Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects Regressions  
 
Table 3.3 presents our results for the pooled OLS and the fixed effects regressions 
based on our sample of 26 middle income countries. The number of observations are 
different in each regression since our dataset covers 45 (from 1970 to 2014) years and 
not all variables are available in this time period. Therefore, due to lack of data we 
have missing variables in some particular years in the dataset. Our findings are mostly 
consistent with the literature (e.g., Aizenman and Marion, 2003; Mwase, 2012). 
We analyse our findings under four main groupings, ‘current account 
vulnerabilities’, ‘capital account vulnerabilities’, ‘credibility of a country’, and 
‘investment vulnerability’. 
3.4.1.1 Current Account Vulnerabilities 
 
We estimate the effects of current account vulnerabilities in reserve holdings using 
proxies such as ‘share of imports in GDP’, ‘current account balance to GDP ratio’, 
‘export volatility’ and ‘trade openness’. 
Our first explanatory variable is the ‘share of imports in GDP’, which captures 
current account vulnerabilities. We used this variable in all alternative specifications 
since it is a main determinant of reserves in the above-mentioned literature. A one 
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unit increase in the ‘share of imports in GDP’ ratio leads to a 0.187 unit increase in 
the reserves-to-GDP ratio, and the coefficient is statistically significant in the pooled 
OLS model. In the fixed effects models, we have mixed findings since the coefficient 
is not significant or positive in some specifications. The coefficient varies from -0.835 
to 0.225 in alternative specifications. 
The remaining three proxies for current account shocks added to the fixed 
effects models 4, 5 and 6, are ‘current account balance to GDP’, ‘export volatility’ 
and ‘trade openness’, respectively. All of them are significant and positive. However, 
export volatility has a very minimal effect on the reserve-to-GDP ratio, whereas trade 
openness and current account to GDP have larger effects. The reserve-to-GDP ratio 
increases by 0.54 unit following a one unit increase in trade openness, while it 
increases by 0.74 unit due to a one unit increase in current account to GDP ratio. We 
also see the influences of ‘current account balance to GDP’ and ‘export volatility’ in 
model 9 where we include all model variables excluding ‘trade openness’. Both 
coefficients support findings from models 4 and 5, since they are still significant and 
positive in model 9. 
3.4.1.2 Capital Account Vulnerabilities 
 
Capital account vulnerabilities are captured by the ‘change in broad money to GDP 
ratio’ and ‘STED-to-GDP’ ratio. Both variables are important determinants of 
reserves-to-GDP for our sample. 
The first ratio is significant in models 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, and has a positive effect 
on the reserves-to-GDP ratio in all specifications. However, it yields an insignificant 
result in the pooled OLS model. In the fixed effects specifications, the coefficient is 
always positive and varies from 0.12 to 0.27 and, mostly, it is statistically significant. 
The ratio is insignificant in models 2, 3 and 4. 
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The second ratio, STED-to-GDP, indicates a positive and mostly significant 
relationship with the reserves-to-GDP ratio in our sample. In the pooled OLS model, a 
one unit increase in the ratio leads to a 0.41 unit increase in the reserve-to-GDP ratio. 
In the fixed effects specifications, the coefficient varies from 0.17 to 0.27. The 
literature (Choi et. al., 2007; Mwase,  2012) presents similar results. 
3.4.1.3 Credibility of Country, Exchange Rate Arrangements and Economic 
Growth 
Real GDP growth per capita, which is a proxy for real earnings growth, comes out as 
statistically insignificant from zero in model 3, but it is statistically significant and 
positive in model 9. In model 9, one unit increase in the growth rate of the economy 
leads a 0.334 unit increase in reserve-to-GDP ratio.  
Another important determinant of reserve holdings is exchange rate flexibility. 
In line with Mwase, (2012), we used volatility in the NEER as a proxy to determine 
this effect. We find a significant negative coefficient for it in the pooled OLS model. 
A one unit increase in volatility of NEER decreases the reserve-to-GDP ratio by 
0.0147. We find mostly insignificant results in most of the specifications in the fixed 
effects models. Only our model 4 and 9 give significant results in the fixed effect 
models. 
In terms of the power of institutions, we used two proxies: government 
effectiveness and political stability. Cheung and Ito (2009) approach the same issue 
and conclude that more powerful institutions in the economy can be seen as higher 
credibility of a country and, therefore, it leads to a lower reserve-to-output ratio. 
However, both these proxies, when included, as in models 7, 8 and 9, yield 
insignificant estimates in our sample. 
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3.4.1.4 Investment Vulnerability 
 
In the pooled OLS model, the investment rate – which is of central theoretical and 
empirical interest in this PhD thesis – comes out with a significant positive 
coefficient, which does not support our analytical results in chapters 1 and 2. While 
surprising, this empirical finding is not inconsistent with similar results in empirical 
regressions which do not confirm theoretical implications of some neoclassical 
growth models (see, e.g., Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013). In our sample, a one unit 
increase in the investment rate leads to an increase in the reserve-to-GDP ratio by 
0.506 unit. However, this coefficient is not robust across all specifications. Although 
the coefficient mostly yields insignificant coefficients in the fixed effect models, it is 
only positive and significant in model 9. The reserve-to-GDP ratio increases by 0.35 
unit following a one unit increase in investment rate in the model 9. 
 
3.4.2 Empirical Results from Quantile Regressions 
 
The estimation results from the quantile and inter-quantile regressions for our sample 
can be seen in tables 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. In both cases, we use only 
specification (1), where the reserve-to-GDP ratio is the dependent variable and the 
change in broad money-to-GDP, share of imports in GDP, investment rate, volatility 
in the NEER, and STED-to-GDP are the independent variables. In line with Mwase, 
(2012), we estimated the model at the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th quantiles for our 26 
countries, see Table 3.4. Table 3.5 reports, in turn, the results from the comparison of 
respective pairs of quantiles. Figure 3.1 shows the ‘box plots’ of our variables and 
indicates that almost each variable has ‘outliers’ in the corresponding distribution of 
the variable. Figure 3.2 presents the ‘quantile distribution plots’ of our variables and 
almost all of them show their distributions are skewed right. 
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The change in the coefficients of model 1 can be seen in Figure 3.3 as the 
quantile increases from 5% to 95%. The green line shows the point estimates from the 
quantile regression from 5% to 95% percentile of the distribution. The blue line 
shows the estimates from the OLS regression. The red dotted lines above and below 
represent the 95% confidence interval. 
We can see obvious differences along the reserve holding distribution between 
middle income countries. Our results thus imply very different results in each variable 
comparing with the pooled OLS model. 
STED-to-GDP has a significant and strongly positive effect across reserve 
holding. It reaches its peak for the countries at 5th percentile and intersects its OLS 
coefficient almost at 75th quantile. However, it gives lower estimate for 75th and 95th 
quantiles. 
The change in the broad money-to-GDP ratio gives insignificant results in all 
quantiles except the 25th; but it reaches its pooled OLS estimate for the countries 
located around the 75th quantile, where it has its maximum along the distribution. 
However, it gives very long estimates for the countries at the tails. 
The share of imports in GDP shows significant positive results alongside the 
distribution. It reaches its peak for the countries located at the 95th quantile and 
crosses its pooled OLS estimate between the 50th and 75th quantiles. Along the 
distribution, it increases as the quantile increases. 
The coefficient to the investment rate shows mostly significant positive values 
along the reserve holding distribution. It has its minimum for the countries located at 
the 25th quantile, whereas it is only insignificant at the 5th quantile. It reaches its 
pooled OLS estimate almost at the 50th quantile, and its peak is at the 75th quantile. 
The volatility in the nominal effective exchange rate yields mostly 
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insignificant estimates along the reserve distribution; it is only significantly negative 
at 50th quantile. 
The dummy variable for sudden stops results in mixed findings. It only yields 
significant estimates for the countries located at the 5th and 75th quantiles, but it has a 
negative value at 5th quantile, whereas it has a positive value for the 75th quantile 
(reaching its maximum).  An increase in the sudden stop dummy decreases reserve-to-
GDP ratio for poorer countries in terms of reserve holding, while it leads an increase 
for relatively richer countries for reserve holding. It can be interpreted that the 
countries in the upper level of reserve-to-GDP distribution holds reserves because of 
an increase in sudden stop probability as a result of precautionary savings. However, 
lower level of reserve-to-GDP distribution shows contradictory results, since any 
increase in the sudden stop probability decreases reserve-to-GDP ratio. This might 
also show a weakness of poorer countries across the sudden stop of capital inflows. 
Their reserve stock could easily deplete during the sudden stops of capital inflows and 
any increase in the probability of sudden stop would lead difficulties in external 
borrowing.   
Table 3.5 shows that the inter-quantile estimates are not constant along the 
different quantiles of the reserve holding distribution. Significant differences, 
particularly between the 5th and the 95th quantiles for the share of imports in GDP, can 
be observed. The investment rate displays highly significant differences in almost all 
quantiles between 5th and 25th, 75th and 95th, and finally 5th and 95th. It only gives 
insignificant difference between the 25th and 50th quantiles. The STED-to-GDP ratio 
shows significant differences between 25th and 50th, 50th and 75th, 75th and 95th, 5th 
and 95th quantile. It also gives insignificant difference between 25th and 50th quantiles. 
As the coefficient of our main interest is the ‘investment rate’, the quantile 
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regression specifications reveal a significant positive estimate for it between all inter-
quantiles (including 5th-95th range) except for 75th-95th quantiles, where it is 
significant and negative. Although we cannot see a negative relationship in our 
sample, in light of the theoretically derived negative influence of the investment rate 
on the optimal reserves-to-GDP ratio in chapters 1 and 2, this last finding can be 
interpreted as indicating that the investment rate affects positively and increasingly in 
terms of magnitude the reserve-to-GDP ratio until the 75th quantile, but then the 
positive magnitude of this coefficient decreases. In other words, only for the top-end 
of the middle income country distribution, i.e., after a specific threshold of economic 
development, investment increases the empirical holdings of reserves in a decreasing 
way (with the coefficient still positive) relative to lower quantiles. 
As in Mwase (2012), middle income countries are found to manifest 
significant differences across the quantiles in our sample. Table 3.5 and Figure 3.3 
confirm these differences. There is huge variation in statistical significance and the 
magnitude of the estimates, as one moves along the quantiles of the reserve holdings 
distribution. Our results are in line with the literature on the precautionary motive, 
according to which countries with high level of short-term external debt accumulate 
international reserves in order to smooth consumption in case of losing access to 
international liquidity. 
 
3.4.3. Comparison of Our Empirical Findings with the Recent Literature  
 
We can directly compare our regression results with Mwase (2012) since we use a 
similar methodology in the empirical specifications and the inclusion of explanatory 
variables, but Mwase’s dataset is larger than ours as we only focus on the ‘middle 
income countries’ in the JR sample. On the other hand, we increased the annual 
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coverage of the sample size. While Mwase (2012) only analyses data from 1999-
2010, our unbalanced panel dataset covers a period from 1970 to 2014. Despite these 
differences, our models give mostly consistent results with Mwase (2012). In order to 
reflect on sample selection, we also check our regressions reducing our data range as 
Mwase (2012). We run same regressions restricting our data. Tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8, 
show our empirical findings from reserve demand regressions, quantile and inter-
quantile regression for our dataset between 1999 and 2010. We can also compare our 
empirical estimates with Aizenman and Marion (2003), Ghosh et. al. (2012) and Sula 
(2011). 
In this subsection, we first present a comparison of the pooled OLS and the 
panel data fixed-effects specifications with the recent literature, and then a 
comparison of the ‘quantile regressions’ is provided. 
3.4.3.1 Comparison of the Pooled OLS and Fixed-Effects Results with the Recent 
Literature 
In the pooled OLS model, our variables, ‘volatility in nominal effective exchange 
rates’, ‘share of imports in GDP’, ‘STED-to-GDP’, all give significant results as in 
Mwase (2012) except change in broad money to GDP ratio which is significant in 
Mwase’s model, with a coefficient of 0.33, while it is insignificant in our sample. 
However, when we restrict our sample between 1999 and 2010, we find a significant 
and positive coefficient as in Mwase (2012). ‘Share of imports in GDP’ gives very 
similar and significant positive estimates, in both studies approximately 0.18. We find 
slightly higher significant positive coefficient in restricted sample at 0.22. Unlike 
Mwase (2012), our pooled OLS model implies almost 3 times larger significant 
positive coefficient for ‘STED-to-GDP’ ratio. Our reduced sample also supports our 
findings for ‘STED-to-GDP’ ratio. In terms of 9», our pooled OLS specification 
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including ‘investment share in GDP’ gives significantly higher model fit than Mwase 
(2012). Our specification results in 9» of 0.51 for the ‘middle income countries’ 
sample, whereas Mwase has it at 0.22 for his EMEs sample. We have similar result in 9» of 0.53 when we reduce our sample. 
These results are also supported by Ghosh et. al. (2012). The authors find a 
significant positive relationship between reserve holdings and ‘share of imports in 
GDP’ as well as ‘STED-to-GDP’. They also report a mostly significant negative 
relationship between the volatility in the NEER and reserves holding. However, Sula 
(2011) only finds a significant and positive relationship for ‘shares of imports in 
GDP’, with insignificant coefficients on ‘exchange rate volatility’ and ‘exports 
volatility’ in the pooled OLS specification. 
This chapter covers a larger range of fixed-effects specifications than Mwase 
(2012). We analyse ‘current account balance to GDP’, ‘real GDP per capita growth 
rate’, ‘export volatility’, ‘trade openness’, ‘government effectiveness’ and ‘political 
stability’ as well as the variables in the pooled OLS model, while Mwase (2012) only 
focusses on ‘government effectiveness’ in the fixed effects specifications35 for EMEs. 
Therefore, we can only compare our models 3 and 7 with Mwase’s paper. 
In model 2, we only focus on the same parameters as in the ‘pooled OLS 
specification’ without any additional variables. Our ‘fixed effects’ specification in 
model 2 yields only one significant coefficient, to the ‘STED-to-GDP’ for the middle 
income countries in the sample, estimated at 0.18. Mwase (2012) reports similar 
results, but the author finds two more significant variables, namely ‘difference in 
broad money to reserve ratio’ and ‘share of imports’. However, there is much 
difference in our findings and Mwase’s findings in terms of estimated coefficients. 
                                                
35	Mwase (2012) focusses those variables (such as, growth rate, export volatility, trade openness) for 
‘small islands’ rather than emerging economies.	
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Mwase (2012) reports fixed-effects significant coefficients of ‘change in broad money 
to GPD ratio’, ‘shares of import in GDP’36 and ‘external debt to GDP’ for his EMEs 
sample at 0.17, 0.20 and 0.15, respectively. In our reduced sample model also gives 
contradictory results with Mwase (2012). We only find a significant coefficient for 
‘change in broad money to reserve ratio’. In model 7, once we include ‘government 
effectiveness’ in the fixed-effects specifications, we found statistically insignificant 
results. Likewise, Mwase (2012) reports an insignificant coefficient for ‘government 
effectiveness’. Our reduced sample also supports our finding for ‘government 
effectiveness’. 
Ghosh et. al. (2012) also mostly support these findings. The authors find a 
significant positive relationship between reserve holdings and ‘share of imports in 
GDP’ and ‘STED-to-GDP’. They also report an insignificant (negative) relationship 
between volatility in the nominal exchange rate and reserve holdings in most of their 
alternative models. 
As in the pooled OLS specifications, our fixed-effect specifications give 
significantly higher 9» values than Mwase (2012). Our specifications show a range 
between 0.40 and 0.51, whereas Mwase’s range was 0.294-0.296 for his EME sample. 
The reduced sample versions of the models also give significantly higher 9» values 
than Mwase (2012) since the range is between 0.40 and 0.53. 
The findings in the fixed-effects specifications are also supported by 
Aizenman and Marion (2003). In their fixed-effect specification, the authors report a 
significant positive estimate for ‘imports share in GDP’. Aizenman and Marion 
(2003) also support our findings for ‘real GDP per capita’, ‘volatility in nominal 
exchange rate’ and ‘export volatility’. Aizenman and Marion (2003) state that the 
                                                
36	Sula (2011) also finds a significant and positive relationship for the ‘share of imports in GDP’.	
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volatility in export receipts should be positively correlated with country’s reserve 
holdings if they are planned to help cushion the economy, and they find a significant 
positive coefficient for ‘export volatility’. As expected, we found a significant and 
positive estimate for ‘export volatility’ in our sample too. Aizenman and Marion 
(2003) also report negative relationship between ‘volatility in nominal exchange rates 
and reserve holdings’ since higher flexibility in exchange rates could lead to a 
decrease in reserve holdings (as the need for reserves declines if countries do not have 
to manage fixed exchange rates). In model 4, we find a significant negative 
relationship for ‘volatility in nominal exchange rates’ for our sample of 26 middle 
income countries too. 
 
3.4.3.2 Comparison of Our Quantile Regression Results with the Recent 
Literature 
 
In our ‘quantile regressions’, we found insignificant coefficients from mostly 5th 
quantile to 95th quantile for ‘broad money to GDP ratio’ for middle income countries 
whereas Mwase (2012) found mixed results in terms of the significance of this 
variable in his EMEs sample. The author finds a significant value at 25th, 50th and 75th 
quantiles, while the coefficient is insignificant at 5th and 95th quantiles. We find only 
significant coefficient at the 25th quantile. In our reduced version of the model, the 
coefficient only gives a significant result for 95th quantile. However, Ghosh et. al. 
(2012) report a significant positive value at all quantiles for ‘broad money to GDP 
ratio’. 
We found a statistically significant and increasing coefficient for the ‘share of 
import in GDP’ across all quantiles. The coefficient increases considerably from 0.13 
to 0.29 from quantiles 5th to 95th. Mwase (2012) indicates an insignificant coefficient 
at the 5th quantile, but significant coefficients as the quantile increases. However, the 
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coefficient follows a mixed pattern since it is relatively low at the 25th and 95th 
quantiles, while it reaches higher values at the 50th and 75th quantiles. Our reduced 
sample also gives a significant positive coefficient for all quantiles and the coefficient 
increases from 25th quantile to 95th quantile. Ghosh et. al. (2012) find a significant 
and positive coefficient for all quantiles, but it decreases from the 25th quantile to 90th 
quantile. Sula (2011) also supports these findings for ‘shares of imports in GDP’, 
since the coefficient is significant and positive for all quantiles. 
Nominal effective exchange rate37 volatility gives insignificant results across 
almost all quantiles in our models, except at the 50th quantile, as well as in Mwase 
(2012)38. This finding is also supported by Ghosh et. al. (2012). They found a weak 
significant and negative coefficient for the 25th and 50th quantiles, but the coefficient 
is always insignificant (and negative) in the upper quantiles. 
The short-term external debt to GDP ratio yields a significant value across all 
quantiles. The range for this coefficient varies from 0.17 to 0.62 across the quartiles. 
We thus find a considerably higher coefficient for the ‘external debt to GDP ratio’ 
than Mwase (2012). He reports a significant coefficient for almost all quantiles except 
the 5th quantile, and the range is between 0.11 and 0.27. Our restricted model also 
supports our findings with a higher ratio than Mwase (2012) since the coefficient is 
significant and varies from 0.15 to 0.60. Ghosh et. al. (2012) report mixed findings 
for the ‘external debt to GDP’ ratio. Even if the coefficient decreases from the 25th 
quantile to the 90th quantile, it yields insignificant estimates in the upper quantiles. 
                                                
37 Sula (2011) presents a significant coefficient after the 25th quantile; however, the author uses 
volatility of the real effective exchange rate (REER), rather than nominal effective exchange rate 
(NEER). 
38 In Mwase (2012), the coefficient only gets a significant value in the 10-percent confidence interval at 
the 50th quantile. However, our restricted sample shows a significant coefficient for all quantiles for 
nominal exchange rate. 
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We find a significant coefficient for the ‘share of imports in GDP’ at 5th-95th 
quantiles, whereas Mwase (2012) finds significant coefficients for 5th-25th, 25th-75th 
and 50th-75th quantiles. Our restricted model also shows a significant coefficient for 
the ‘share of imports in GDP’ at 5th-95th and 75th-95th quantiles.  Sula (2011) reports 
different results than our findings. The author finds a negative relationship between 
‘reserve holdings’ and ‘shares of import’ across all inter-quantiles except 5th-25th 
quantile and the coefficient only shows a significant value in 25th-75th inter-quantile 
range.  
‘Nominal effective exchange rate volatility’ implies an insignificant 
coefficient for all inter-quantile ranges in our specifications as well as in Mwase 
(2012). Our restricted model also supports our findings with an insignificant 
coefficient for all inter-quantiles. Sula (2011) finds mixed results, with significant 
range in 5th-25th and 75th-95th quantiles. We found a significant result at 5th -25th, 50th-
75th, 75th-95th and 5th-95th inter-quantiles for ‘external debt to GDP ratio’, whereas 
Mwase (2012) only shows a significant value for the 5th -25th and 5th-95th inter-
quantiles.  The restricted model supports our findings since the coefficient is 
significant at 5th -25th, 50th-75th, 75th-95th and 5th-95th inter-quantiles. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Using panel data and quantile regression techniques, this chapter examines the 
determinants of international reserves from a broader perspective than usual studies in 
the literature and employing a sample of 26 middle income countries. We find many 
interpretable significant relationships between reserve holdings and their empirical 
determinants. Moreover, our results also imply considerable heterogeneity of the 
estimates across the reserve holdings distribution for our sample. 
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Based on our analytical results in chapters 1 and 2, we essentially added the 
investment share in GDP to the standard ‘buffer stock’ model explanatory variables in 
the literature in this last, applied chapter 3 of the thesis. Our pooled OLS results show 
that almost all variables have significant expected effects on reserve holdings in terms 
of sign of coefficients, except the ‘change in broad money to GDP’ which comes out 
as not significant in our sample and the investment rate, which is significant but 
positive. In that latter sense, the empirical findings with regard to this central 
determinant of interest here, the investment rate, are not supportive of the analytical 
results in chapters 1 and 2. These theoretical chapters derived analytically a negative 
influence of the investment rate on the optimal level of reserves in terms of output. 
Note however that, firstly, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) state the following: “The 
textbook neoclassical growth model predicts that countries with faster productivity 
growth should invest more and attract more foreign capital. We show that the 
allocation of capital flows across developing countries is the opposite to this 
prediction: capital does not flow more to countries that invest and grow more.” (p. 
1484, abstract). Insofar these authors employ exactly the same labour-augmenting CD 
production function specification as we do in chapter 2, our lack of empirical support 
for theoretical results found within the same neoclassical growth framework and 
common assumptions may not be that surprising. Then, secondly, while our 
theoretical chapters 1 and 2 derive the ‘optimal’ level of international reserves as a 
ratio to output, what the dataset measures indeed is the de facto level of international 
reserves-to-GDP prevailing in the countries of our sample. As the optimal reserve 
ratio quantified at the level of 5.5% of GDP in chapter 2 with labour-augmenting CD 
technology is found near the bottom of the empirical distribution of actual reserves in 
our dataset (see Figure 1), this fact may well indicate that actual reserves are 
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excessive relative to GDP for many middle income countries, which has also been 
claimed, notably, by Aizenman and Marion (2004) and Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009). A 
final point of precision to the above findings requires to emphasise that our quantile 
and inter-quantile regression results reveal a nuance in the sense that at the top-end of 
the empirical reserves distribution the positive coefficient on the investment rate starts 
to decline in magnitude relative to the lower quantiles. In other words, even if we 
cannot see a negative relationship between the reserves-to-output ratio and the 
investment rate in our dataset, the coefficient to the investment rate is relatively lower 
for the richest middle income countries compared to the poorer ones. 
Overall, our quantile and inter quantile regression results suggest mixed 
findings along the reserve holdings distribution. Our F-test results comparing the inter 
quantiles reject the null hypothesis that our models for different quantiles of the 
reserve holding distribution of the middle income countries in the sample were 
similar. In other words, it suggests that there are significant differences for the 
countries along the reserve holdings distribution, particularly for some variables such 
as, the ‘share of imports in GDP’, ‘investment rate’ and ‘short term external debt to 
GDP’. 
Our analysis can be developed in several ways. First of all, the sample can be 
extended for emerging market economies rather than only focusing on middle income 
countries. Secondly, exchange rate regimes can be another dummy variable, in 
addition to sudden stops: then, we could possibly judge about the effect of exchange-
rate regimes in a better way. Lastly, we followed only determinants which are related 
to precautionary motives of reserve holding rather than mercantilist motives, as some 
studies claim to be observed for East Asian economies. These variables can be added 
to the usual determinants of international reserves. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
 
3.A Quantile Regression Methodology 
 
Since the OLS regression does not allow for changes across the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable, the effect of the independent variables that vary 
along the conditional distribution can be analysed by the quantile regression method 
(Koenker and Bassett 1978; Koenker and Hallock 2001). 
The original model can be presented as follows, w = 8yu + ‘ 
where w is the dependent variable (reserves to GDP ratio), and 8 is a matrix of 
explanatory variables and ‘ is the error term.  
Then for the s"’ quantile of the dependent variable conditional on the value of 
the independent variables describe as,  ÷?∞Xo∆¨“™ w 8 = ◊ = ◊yu s 			∞XØ			0 < 	s < 1 
where ÷?∞Xo∆¨“™ w 8 = ◊  indicates the s"’ quantile of w conditional on 8 = ◊. u is a vector of coefficients for each s"’ quantile with between 0 and 1. The 
error term, –, is specified as an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) process 
and it satisfies the quantile restriction, ÷?∞Xo∆¨“™ – 8 = ◊ = 0 
Then, in order to show the s"’ regression quantile estimate u(s), we need to 
minimize the sum of absolute deviations. Therefore, the minimization problem can be 
written as, min¤‹ë∑ s w − 8yu + 1 − s w − 8yuº›ﬁﬂ¤º‡ﬁﬂ¤  
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Increasing s from 0 to 1, we can follow the distribution of dependent variable, w, conditional on explanatory variables, 8. We followed this process for s = 0.05, s = 0.25, s = 0.5, s = 0.75 and s = 0.95.  
The standard errors for the quantile estimates can be obtained by 
bootstrapping with 1000 replications. 
Once we have the distribution of dependent variable for different quantiles, an 
inter-quantile regression can also be estimated by taking the difference of the 
coefficients from any specified quantiles. This method allows to test the significance 
of the difference among quantile coefficients. For any given two quantiles	sQ and s», 
the inter-quantile difference gives an estimate of, w s» − w sQ = ◊yu s» −	◊yu sQ 	 
 where the values of the depended and independent variables at the different quantiles 
 are provided by bootstrap (Davino et al., 2014 p. 81). 
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3.B.1 Tables  
 
Table 3.1: Description of Variables 
 
Variables Rationale Variable Description Data Source 
 
Reserves 
 
 
 
Export Volatility 
 
 
 
GDP Growth 
 
 
Share of Imports in GDP 
 
 
 
 
Investment rate 
 
 
 
Openness 
 
 
 
 
External Debt to GDP 
 
 
Money-to-GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
Interest Rate 
 
 
 
 
Government Effectiveness 
 
 
Political Stability 
 
 
 
NEER Volatility 
 
 
Crisis Dummy 
 
 
Dependent variable 
 
 
 
Captures current account 
vulnerability 
 
 
Proxy for real earnings 
growth 
 
Proxy for current account 
vulnerability 
 
 
 
Proxy for investment 
vulnerability 
 
 
Proxy for current account 
vulnerability 
 
 
 
Proxy for capital account 
vulnerability 
 
Proxy for financial depth; 
captures capital account 
vulnerability 
 
 
 
Proxy for the opportunity 
cost of holding reserves 
 
 
 
Proxy for institutions 
 
 
Proxy for institutions 
 
 
 
Exchange rate volatility 
 
 
Crisis effect 
 
 
 
Reserves minus Gold as a 
share of GDP 
 
 
Export to GDP 
 
 
 
Real GDP per capita growth 
 
 
Imports as a share of GDP 
 
 
 
 
Gross capital (fixed) 
formation as a share of 
GDP 
 
Imports plus exports as a 
share of GDP 
 
 
 
Short-term external debt as 
a share of GDP 
 
Broad money as a share of 
GDP 
 
 
 
 
Interest differential with the 
US. 
 
 
 
Proxy for institutions, 
focusing on governance 
 
Proxy for institutions, 
focusing on governance 
 
 
Volatility of the nominal 
effective exchange rate 
 
Is 1 crisis, 0 otherwise. 
Constructed using sudden 
stops of capital flows 
 
 
WDI, WDI 
 
 
 
WDI 
 
 
 
WDI 
 
 
WDI 
 
 
 
 
WDI 
 
 
 
WDI 
 
 
 
 
WDI 
 
 
WDI 
 
 
 
 
 
WEO, IFS, IMF, WDI 
 
 
 
 
World Bank, Kaufmann and 
Kraay governance 
indicators 
World Bank, Kaufmann and 
Kraay governance 
indicators 
 
Bruegel 
 
 
Author’s calculations 
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Table 3.2: Country List 
 
 
Country 
 
Low Middle 
Income 
 
High Middle 
Income 
 
High Income 
 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Czech Republic 
Dominican Rep. 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hungary 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Romania 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
 
 Note: The countries are classified according to the World Bank’s classification. 
 Table 3.3: Emerging Markets Reserve Demand Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
          ∆(Broad Money to GDP) 0.160 0.115 0.126 0.0682 0.146** 0.117* 0.271** 0.272** 0.226*** 
 (0.105) (0.0748) (0.0795) (0.0564) (0.0629) (0.0668) (0.116) (0.112) (0.0736) 
Share of Imports in GDP 0.187*** 0.156 0.159* 0.225** 0.152 -0.835** 0.148 0.146 0.203** 
 (0.0293) (0.0950) (0.0929) (0.0990) (0.0912) (0.353) (0.0961) (0.102) (0.0972) 
Investment Rate 0.506*** 0.0290 -0.00977 0.408 -0.0468 0.310 0.124 0.137 0.354* 
 (0.0847) (0.245) (0.250) (0.247) (0.167) (0.241) (0.210) (0.216) (0.175) 
NEER Volatility -0.0147** -0.0114 -0.0125 -0.0172** -0.0171 -0.0186 -0.0133 -0.0154 -0.0209*** 
 (0.00696) (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.00785) (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0147) (0.0145) (0.00686) 
STED-to-GDP 0.410*** 0.184** 0.186*** 0.241* 0.182** 0.272*** 0.152 0.153 0.178* 
 (0.0495) (0.0711) (0.0659) (0.121) (0.0700) (0.0943) (0.109) (0.109) (0.0957) 
Sudden Stop Dummy 0.464 -1.918** -1.522* -2.426** -2.060** -2.476*** -2.137 -2.227* -2.613** 
 (1.580) (0.886) (0.814) (0.874) (0.853) (0.813) (1.372) (1.252) (1.019) 
Growth Rate   0.204      0.334* 
   (0.128)      (0.162) 
Current Account Balance 
to GDP 
   0.735***     0.583** 
    (0.242)     (0.226) 
Export Volatility     1.78e-09***    1.24e-09*** 
     (1.68e-10)    (2.13e-10) 
Trade Openness      0.541**    
      (0.201)    
Government 
Effectiveness 
      3.459  0.779 
       (4.510)  (3.238) 
Political Stability        0.335 0.189 
        (2.154) (1.641) 
Constant -10.25*** 3.625 3.799 -5.433 5.347 -4.192 2.523 2.049 -4.005 
 (2.191) (5.286) (5.307) (6.070) (3.787) (6.713) (4.824) (4.905) (5.402) 
          
Observations 512 512 512 501 512 512 410 410 403 
R-squared 0.510 0.406 0.411 0.513 0.502 0.493 0.410 0.404 0.561 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of country  26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.4: Quantile Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Model 2 5th Quantile 25th Quantile 50th Quantile 75th Quantile 95th Quantile 
        ∆(Broad Money to GDP) 0.160 0.115 0.0450 0.101* 0.0926 0.166 0.0387 
 (0.105) (0.0748) (0.0384) (0.0527) (0.0632) (0.108) (0.191) 
Share of Imports in GDP 0.187*** 0.156 0.138*** 0.141*** 0.152*** 0.205*** 0.291*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0950) (0.0172) (0.0140) (0.0240) (0.0377) (0.0451) 
Investment Rate 0.506*** 0.0290 0.0306 0.376*** 0.502*** 0.757*** 0.468*** 
 (0.0847) (0.245) (0.0266) (0.0581) (0.0874) (0.121) (0.153) 
NEER Volatility -0.0147** -0.0114 0.00298 -0.00154 -0.0183*** -0.0109 -0.0380 
 (0.00696) (0.0171) (0.0140) (0.0202) (0.00659) (0.00974) (0.0670) 
STED-to-GDP 0.410*** 0.184** 0.624*** 0.476*** 0.508*** 0.354*** 0.174* 
 (0.0495) (0.0711) (0.0274) (0.0337) (0.0267) (0.0788) (0.0962) 
Sudden Stop Dummy 0.464 -1.918** -2.761*** 0.142 1.491 3.525* 2.559 
 (1.580) (0.886) (0.658) (0.664) (2.428) (1.802) (2.698) 
Constant -10.25*** 3.625 -6.060*** -10.27*** -9.771*** -13.01*** -3.132 
 (2.191) (5.286) (0.616) (1.450) (1.904) (2.646) (11.32) 
        
Observations 512 512 512 512 512 512 512 
R-squared 0.510 0.406      
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of country  26      
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5: Inter-Quantile Regression 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 5th-25th Quantile 25th-50th Quantile 50th-75th Quantile 75th-95th Quantile 5th-95th Quantile 
      ∆(Broad Money to GDP) 0.0556 -0.00804 0.0734 -0.127 -0.00632 
 (0.0972) (0.120) (0.118) (0.188) (0.167) 
Share of Imports in GDP 0.00292 0.0116 0.0526 0.0860 0.153*** 
 (0.0408) (0.0177) (0.0476) (0.0525) (0.0494) 
Investment Rate 0.346*** 0.125 0.256** -0.289* 0.437*** 
 (0.109) (0.117) (0.113) (0.169) (0.166) 
NEER Volatility -0.00452 -0.0167 0.00737 -0.0271 -0.0410 
 (0.0706) (0.0254) (0.0194) (0.0179) (0.0458) 
STED-to-GDP -0.148* 0.0318 -0.154* -0.180** -0.450*** 
 (0.0860) (0.0666) (0.0910) (0.0866) (0.119) 
Sudden Stop Dummy 2.902* 1.349 2.034 -0.967 5.319 
 (1.625) (2.313) (2.392) (3.004) (3.568) 
Constant -4.209 0.498 -3.235 9.873 2.927 
 (3.086) (2.409) (3.045) (6.836) (7.837) 
      
Observations 512 512 512 512 512 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
F-test 2.431** 0.870 2.512** 3.742*** 6.379*** 
Prob>F 0.0342 0.501 0.0293 0.00247 9.42e-06 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6: Emerging Markets Reserve Demand Regression between 1999-2010  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         ∆(Broad Money to GDP) 0.271** 0.209*** 0.229*** 0.145** 0.204** 0.188*** 0.248** 0.246** 
 (0.123) (0.0739) (0.0776) (0.0537) (0.0741) (0.0598) (0.0996) (0.102) 
Share of Imports in GDP 0.227*** 0.104 0.105 0.231*** 0.132 -1.116*** 0.0856 0.0880 
 (0.0413) (0.0844) (0.0828) (0.0816) (0.0833) (0.338) (0.0816) (0.0855) 
Investment Rate 0.572*** 0.0179 -0.0432 0.455* -0.0469 0.333 0.0277 0.0300 
 (0.125) (0.210) (0.201) (0.261) (0.157) (0.240) (0.190) (0.194) 
NEER Volatility -0.291** 0.0369 0.0791 -0.111 0.000330 -0.108 -0.00792 0.00111 
 (0.136) (0.128) (0.144) (0.117) (0.125) (0.113) (0.157) (0.170) 
STED-to-GDP 0.348*** 0.135 0.165 0.199 0.0677 0.138 0.0986 0.113 
 (0.0584) (0.121) (0.106) (0.152) (0.103) (0.162) (0.129) (0.128) 
Sudden Stop Dummy 1.836 -0.422 -0.417 -0.927 -0.622 -0.968 -0.434 -0.445 
 (2.177) (1.314) (1.264) (1.134) (1.226) (0.922) (1.513) (1.574) 
Growth Rate   0.327      
   (0.194)      
Current Account Balance to GDP    0.742***     
    (0.256)     
Export Volatility     1.80e-09***    
     (1.64e-10)    
Trade Openness      0.686***   
      (0.195)   
Government Effectiveness       -4.186  
       (5.432)  
Political Stability        -0.297 
        (1.899) 
Constant -9.455*** 7.367* 7.390* -5.162 7.774** -2.146 7.898* 7.946* 
 (2.834) (4.258) (4.104) (6.937) (3.092) (6.220) (4.167) (3.934) 
         
Observations 284 284 284 279 284 284 259 259 
R-squared 0.538 0.401 0.415 0.522 0.513 0.523 0.388 0.382 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of country  26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.7: Quantile Regression between 1999-2010 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Pooled OLS Model 2 5th Quantile 25th Quantile 50th Quantile 75th Quantile 95th Quantile 
        ∆(Broad Money to GDP) 0.271** 0.209*** 0.0317 0.0848 0.169 0.251 0.264* 
 (0.123) (0.0739) (0.0825) (0.0794) (0.106) (0.191) (0.134) 
Share of Imports in GDP 0.227*** 0.104 0.182*** 0.157*** 0.170*** 0.191*** 0.304*** 
 (0.0413) (0.0844) (0.0143) (0.0259) (0.0281) (0.0685) (0.0451) 
Investment Rate 0.572*** 0.0179 0.0917** 0.442*** 0.579*** 0.809*** 0.602*** 
 (0.125) (0.210) (0.0388) (0.0658) (0.106) (0.228) (0.132) 
NEER Volatility -0.291** 0.0369 -0.156 -0.286*** -0.313** -0.521*** -0.428*** 
 (0.136) (0.128) (0.123) (0.0555) (0.122) (0.107) (0.127) 
STED-to-GDP 0.348*** 0.135 0.599*** 0.480*** 0.470*** 0.337*** 0.154* 
 (0.0584) (0.121) (0.0322) (0.0386) (0.0580) (0.118) (0.0925) 
Sudden Stop Dummy 1.836 -0.422 -2.360** -1.532 3.157 7.792*** 5.649*** 
 (2.177) (1.314) (1.098) (0.960) (4.532) (2.776) (1.815) 
Constant -9.455*** 7.367* -7.188*** -7.990*** -8.585*** -7.575 -1.408 
 (2.834) (4.258) (2.463) (1.539) (2.015) (4.953) (2.668) 
        
Observations 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 
R-squared 0.538 0.401      
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of country  26      
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 140	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.8: Inter-Quantile Regression between 1999-2010 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 5th-25th Quantile 25th-50th Quantile 50th-75th Quantile 75th-95th Quantile 5th-95th Quantile 
      ∆(Broad Money to 
GDP) 
0.0531 0.0839 0.0828 0.0122 0.232 
 (0.152) (0.176) (0.201) (0.187) (0.295) 
Share of Imports in 
GDP 
-0.0253 0.0135 0.0202 0.113* 0.121* 
 (0.0442) (0.0381) (0.0566) (0.0648) (0.0660) 
Investment Rate 0.351*** 0.137 0.230 -0.207 0.510** 
 (0.125) (0.132) (0.166) (0.170) (0.225) 
NEER Volatility -0.130 -0.0269 -0.208 0.0928 -0.272 
 (0.211) (0.160) (0.214) (0.289) (0.221) 
STED-to-GDP -0.119** -0.0104 -0.133** -0.183* -0.446*** 
 (0.0606) (0.0614) (0.0627) (0.0941) (0.111) 
Sudden Stop Dummy 0.828 4.688 4.635 -2.143 8.008** 
 (2.442) (4.184) (2.921) (6.554) (3.708) 
Constant -0.803 -0.595 1.010 6.168 5.780 
 (4.194) (2.744) (4.365) (3.918) (4.514) 
      
Observations 284 284 284 284 284 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
F-test 3.976 0.539 4.118 1.072 4.500 
Prob>F 0.00170 0.747 0.00128 0.376 0.000591 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
3.B.2 Figures 
 
Figure 3.1: Box Plots 
 
 
 
Note: Panels shows the distribution of the dataset. Although almost all panels include outliers, our 
dataset is positively skewed for: i) the reserve to GDP ratio; ii) broad money to GDP; iii) the share of 
imports in GDP; iv) the external debt to GDP ratio, v) trade openness; vi) the investment rate; and 
negatively skewed for government effectiveness. Furthermore, the growth rate of economy, the current 
account balance to GDP ratio and political stability are mostly normally distributed. 
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Figure 3.2: Quantile Distribution Plots 
 
Note: These are the variables used in the quantile regressions. Each value of the variable is plotted 
against the fraction of their corresponding data that have values less than that fraction. The diagonal 
line is a reference line. It is obvious that all the points for each variable are below the reference line. 
Hence, we know that the distributions of all variables are skewed right. 
 
Figure 3.3: Comparison of OLS and Quantile Regression Coefficient Estimates 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figure shows, the change in the coefficients of model 1 as the quantile increases from 
5% to 95%. The green line shows the point estimates from the quantile regression from 5% to 
95% percentile of the distribution. The blue line shows the estimates from the OLS regression. 
The red dotted lines above and below represent the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.4: International Reserves as % of GDP by Country	
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, using data from IMF’s International Financial Statistics, and World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
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Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
 
This PhD thesis contributed to the literature on international reserves, analysing in 
particular the role of key neoclassical growth theory variables such as investment, 
capital, labour and population growth on the optimal holdings of reserves relative to 
output in production small open economies (SOEs). Featuring technology consistent 
with the most common endogenous (AK IRS) and exogenous (labour-augmenting CD 
CRS) neoclassical growth specifications, our theoretical chapters 1 and 2 derived and 
quantified using calibration based on our dataset, respectively, two operational 
formulas of the optimal reserves-to-GDP ratio for production SOEs that are seeking to 
insure themselves against sudden stops of capital inflows. The last, empirical chapter 
3 took a statistical approach to the distribution of actual international reserves in our 
sample of middle income SOEs, and essentially found much heterogeneity. To reveal 
this heterogeneity, it employed the better suited ‘quantile regressions’, in addition to 
‘pooled OLS’ and fixed-effects panel data methods, to analyse our sample of middle 
income countries, considering idiosyncratic as well as common features across them. 
Chapter 1 examined the effects of investment and production on optimal 
reserves in SOE EMEs and derived an optimal reserves-to-output formula in the case 
where capital is the only factor of production as in the AK model of endogenous 
growth. We found that the endogenous growth AK model with IRS implies a negative 
relationship between the optimal reserve-to-output ratio and capital-augmenting (in 
fact, here sole-factor) technological progress. Depending on the calibration of the 
productivity parameter, the model of chapter 1 quantified the optimal ratio of reserves 
to output at 1.74% for production SOEs. 
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Chapter 2 introduced labour, making the production function more general and 
employing a labour-augmenting Cobb-Douglas (CD) production function. The latter 
embodied the alternative assumptions of constant returns to scale (CRS) overall – but 
with diminishing returns to scale (DRS) for each of the two factors, capital and labour 
– and convergence to a balanced growth path (BGP) in the long run. Hence, the 
second chapter focused on the effects of labour-augmenting productivity and 
population growth on the optimal reserves-to-output ratio in a production SOE. 
Moreover, the alternative modelling of the production function, IRS AK versus CRS 
CD, allowed a comparison of the analytical results in chapter 1 (AK model) with 
those in chapter 2 (the CD model). As in the endogenous growth AK model, we found 
analytically that in the exogenous growth CD model along the BGP labour-
augmenting technological progress decreases the optimal reserves-to-output ratio. 
Depending on the calibration of the labour-augmenting productivity parameter, the 
CRS CD model quantified the optimal ratio of reserves to output at 5.5% in the richer 
two-factor production SOE model. This is almost three times higher ratio of optimal 
reserve holdings to output relative to the AK IRS model.  
However, both these ratios are still quite lower than the corresponding one 
derived in the endowment SOE model of Jeanne and Rancière (2011), 9.1% that we 
extended to production. Our intuition for the optimally lower ratios in chapter 1 and 2 
can be outlined in the following way. With the capital stock now accumulated via 
investment and potentially used as a pledge to external creditors in obtaining 
borrowing and therefore insuring better against sudden stops, the optimal reserve-to-
output ratio is much lower in the AK endogenous growth model relative to the 
otherwise similar endowment economy model of JR. As depreciation depletes the 
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installed capital stock, thus acting in the opposite direction to net investment, the 
reversal of the relationship is not surprising in both the AK and CD models. 
Applying innovatively appropriate econometric techniques to investigate the 
distribution of actual international reserves based on a dataset of 26 middle income 
economies, chapter 3 studied the key theory-derived determinants of reserves relative 
to output highlighted in chapters 1 and 2 together with the most common empirically 
motivated determinants suggested in the literature as ‘control variables’. For this 
purpose, we initially estimated a pooled OLS benchmark and a panel data fixed-
effects model to analyse the relative importance of such empirically measured 
determinants of real-world reserve holdings as well as possible country specificities. 
We then used quantile regression techniques to explore the variation in these 
determinants across the reserve holdings distribution in our sample. We examined the 
uniformity of coefficients by several quantile regressions and the overall models. Our 
quantile regression results suggest that there are substantial variations in middle 
income countries in terms of the reserve holdings distribution. We found many 
interpretable significant relationships between reserve holdings and their empirical 
determinants. Moreover, our results also implied considerable heterogeneity of the 
estimates across the reserve holdings distribution for our sample. 
In terms of potential implications for future research, we would like to 
emphasise that the neoclassical growth assumptions we employed may well be too 
abstract and unrealistic when it comes to empirical support in the data. This is also 
recently established by other similar studies, notably Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013). 
This implies that potential extensions to our modelling work in chapters 1 and 2 may 
need to relax some restrictive neoclassical assumptions, most obviously the constant 
saving rate equivalent to the investment rate. Moreover, it may be worth going into 
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richer, two-sector open economy models and into richer structure of financial 
instruments and markets. In our case, the theoretical chapters 1 and 2 derived 
analytically a negative influence of the investment rate on the optimal level of 
reserves in terms of output, while the empirical chapter 3 mostly found a significant 
positive effect. 
In terms of policy implications, we think that the main insight from this PhD 
thesis relates to the debate of excessive reserve levels relative to GDP as an insurance 
device against capital flow reversals kept by many real-world economies. Our 
theoretical chapters 1 and 2 derived the ‘optimal’ level of international reserves as a 
ratio to output, and quantified it at 5.5% of GDP in chapter 2 with labour-augmenting 
CD technology. This order of magnitude places the optimal reserve-to-GDP ratio near 
the bottom of the empirical distribution of actual reserves in our dataset (illustrated in 
Figure 1). This finding, highlighting a considerable discrepancy between the 
theoretically derived optimal reserves-to-output ratio and the much higher real-world 
ratios now involving not optimal but actual reserves, leads us to conclude in favour of 
excessive reserves relative to GDP held in most of the middle income countries in our 
sample. Such a conclusion is in line with recent claims that actually held reserves are 
excessive by Aizenman and Marion (2004) and Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009), among 
many other authors. 
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